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A bstract
Suppose n players are placed randomly on the real line at consecutive 
integers, and faced in random directions. Each player has maximum 
speed one and cannot see the others. The least expected time required 
for m (<  n) of them to meet together at a single point, if all players have 
to use the same strategy, is the symmetric rendezvous value R amn. If the 
players can use different strategies, the least expected meeting time is 
the asymmetric rendezvous value We show that R % 2 is 47/48 and
is asymptotic to n/2. If the minimax rendezvous time Mn is the 
minimum time required to ensure that all players can meet together at 
a single point regardless of their initial placement, we prove that M 2 is 
3, M3 is 4 and Mn is asymptotic to n/2. If players have to stick together 
upon meeting, we prove that three players require 5 time units to ensure 
a meeting.
We also consider a problem proposed by S. Alpern (in his joint paper 
with A. Beck, Rendezvous Search on the Line with Bounded Resources, 
LSE Math Preprint Series, 92 (1995)) of how two players can optimally 
rendezvous while at the same time evading an enemy searcher. We model 
this rendezvous-evasion problem as a two-person, zero-sum game between 
the rendezvous team R  (with agents Ri, R2) and the searcher S  and 
consider a version which is discrete in time and space. R\, R 2 and S  
start at different locations among n identical locations and no two of them 
share a common labelling of the locations. Each player can move between 
any two locations in one time step (this includes the possibility of staying 
still) until at least two of them are at the same location together, at which 
time the game ends. If S  is at this location, S  (maximizer) wins and the
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payoff is 1; otherwise the team R  (minimizer) wins and the payoff is 0. 
The value of the game vn is the probability that S  wins under optimal 
play. We assume that jRi and R 2 can jointly randomize their strategies 
and prove that V3  is 47/76 «  0.61842 and V4  is at least 31/54 «  0.57407. 
If all the players share a common notion of a directed cycle containing all 
the n locations (while still able to move between any two locations), the 
value of the game dn is ((1 — 2/ n )n_1 + 1)/2. In particular, dz is less than 
V3  and 6 4  is less than V4 . We also compare some of these results with 
those obtained when the rendezvous-evasion game is modelled as a multi­
stage game with observed actions (W. S. Lim, Rendezvous-Evasion As a 
Multi-Stage Game With Observed Actions, LSE Math-CDAM Research 
Report Series, 96-05 (1996)). In all instances considered, we find that 
obligatory announcement of actions at the end of each step either does 
not affect the value of the game or helps the rendezvous team  secure a 
lower value.
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C h a p t e r  1
I n t r o  d u c t i o n
1.1 In tro d u ctio n  To T h e R en d ezv o u s Search  
P ro b lem
The problem of rendezvous search asks how two people placed in a known 
search region can find each other in least expected time. This problem 
arises typically when two people wish to meet each other but fail to spec­
ify an exact location and communication is not possible. The scenario 
where two people lose each other in a departmental store and wish to 
meet up again is one such example. Essentially, the rendezvous search 
problem is concerned with the study of coordination without communi­
cation.
This problem is first mentioned by Schelling in his early classic work 
on game theory [22] where the emphasis is on coordination with focal 
points; a focal point is a location or signal identified by the parties in­
volved as unique. For example, Schelling asked a group of respondents 
to imagine that each of them was one of two individuals trying to meet 
one another in New York under the circumstances where communication
11
is not possible. Each individual is to choose some place in New York and 
any location is as good as the other so long as both of them pick the same 
location. It seems an impossible task as there are an infinite number of 
choices for the location. However, the majority of the respondents chose 
the same place - Grand Central Station. In this problem, Grand Central 
Station has certain prominence which renders it to ‘stand out’ among 
all other locations to be chosen by the respondents; it provided a ‘focal 
point for each individual’s expectation of what the other expects him to 
expect to be expected to do’ (Schelling [22], p. 57). In another exam­
ple, Schelling considered the problem faced by two parachutists landing 
in a field with some known feature (house, river, bridge etc) and asked 
which of these should they use as focal points to meet at. He argued 
that a player should not simply predict where the other will go, since 
the other player will go to where he predicts the first player would go, 
which is where the first player predicts the second to predict the first 
to go, and so on ad infinitum. Schelling’s approach was considered as 
a paradigm for coordination problem and parallel processing. However, 
the treatment of the subject has been non-mathematical.
The rendezvous search problem was first formulated in a mathemati­
cal framework by Alpern [1]. The approach differs from that of Schelling’s 
by assuming that the search region is homogeneous (absence of focal 
points) and players move so as to meet (i.e., when the distance between 
them comes within a given detection radius) in the least expected time, 
i.e., this is not a one-shot game. In his paper, Alpern discusses the notion 
of a given group G of isometries (of the search region) and its connection 
with the spatial symmetries of the search region (from the point of view 
of the players). Consider the example where the search region is the cir­
cumference of a circle. In the extreme case where the given group G is
12
the trivial group consisting of only the identity element, players regard 
all points on the circle as unique. We may thus interpret the search re­
gion as a clock face which both players can read so that the strategy Go 
to 1 2  o ’ clock is a legitimate strategy. If G is the group consisting of all 
rotations, one possible interpretation is that the players have a common 
notion of ‘up’ (and thus a common notion of clockwise and anticlockwise 
directions along the cycle). Then they could agree to move in opposite 
angular directions after their random placement. However, for the same 
circular region where the group G consists of all isometries of the cycle 
(rotations and reflections), a strategy pair such as that described above 
(which dictates that players move in opposite angular directions) would 
not be feasible since players here no longer share a common notion of a 
clockwise (or anticlockwise) direction. In general, by a random placement 
of the players onto the search region, Nature chooses a random element g 
from the isometry group G such that if players are using strategies si and 
S2, the meeting time T (g s i ,s2) is the first tim e when the paths g(,si(t)) 
and s 2 (t) come within the detection radius. There is no need for two ran­
dom elements <71, g2 since T(giS\,g 2 s2) is equals to T(g2 1 g iS i,s2). The 
expected meeting time for the players is thus T(gs\, s2) averaged over all 
elements g in the given isometry group G. Alpern [1] also introduces two 
versions of the rendezvous search problem, namely, the asymmetric and 
the symmetric. In the asymmetric version, players are distinguishable 
and thus can use different strategies. The least expected time for the 
players to meet is referred to as the asymmetric rendezvous value R a. In 
the symmetric version however, players are indistinguishable and must 
therefore adopt the same mixed strategy. This scenario is equivalent to 
one where a controller broadcasts the players’ strategies and since he 
has no means of identifying the players, he announces a single mixed
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strategy which is adopted by both players. The choice of a mixed strat­
egy is necessary here because there is a possibility that players will not 
meet at all if they are to use the same pure strategy. For example, two 
players placed on the circumference of a circle will never meet if both of 
them use the same pure strategy and were pointed in the same direction 
initially since the distance between them is preserved. When players 
are constrained to use the same mixed strategy, the expected meeting 
time is the expectation of T(gs\, S2), where the expectation is taken over 
all elements g in the isometry group G, and over all pure strategies $1, 
S2 chosen independently according to the common mixed strategy. The 
least expected time required for the players to meet is referred to as 
the symmetric rendezvous value R s. Anderson and Weber [8] considered 
symmetric rendezvous on n locations in discrete time and proved that 
the players can do better than visit each location at random when n is 
at least 3. Subsequent work concentrated on the case where the search 
region is the line. In [5], Alpern and Gal showed that when two play­
ers are placed at a known distance of one apart and have no common 
notion of a positive direction along the line, the asymmetric rendezvous 
value R a is given by 13/8 (=  1.625). In the analogous symmetric prob­
lem, Anderson and Essegaier [7] proved that the symmetric rendezvous 
value R a is bounded above by 2.28. This estimate has recently been im­
proved upon by V. Baston [9]. A similar problem has been considered 
in [19] and [23] where two players must coordinate to find a third party 
who is stationary and whose distribution is known. Alpern and Beck [4] 
solved the rendezvous search problem on the line where the players are 
constrained by fuel resources, quantified in terms of given bounds on the 
total distance that each player may travel. When players can ensure that 
they meet, the problem of minimizing the expected meeting time is con­
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sidered. In the instance where both players run out of fuel before they 
meet, the problem of minimizing this probability was studied. J. Howard 
[12] solved the rendezvous problem on the interval, where the players can 
see how far they are from each end (of the interval), but cannot see each 
other. He assumed that the players are placed independently according 
to a common distribution which has a monotone density (for example, 
the uniform distribution). A simulation approach to Schelling’s problem 
is considered in [24].
1.2 O verv iew  o f  T h esis
In Chapter 2, we extend the analysis of the rendezvous search problem 
on the line to more than two players. This work is motivated by one of 
the questions posed in [1]. We consider the scenario where n blind, speed 
one, players are placed by a random permutation onto the integers 0 to 
(n — 1) on the line, and each is pointed randomly to the right or left. 
We seek to find the least expected time required for m(< n ) of them to 
meet together at a single point and denote this time by the asymmetric 
rendezvous value R^m  (if players can use different strategies) and the 
symmetric rendezvous value Rsn m^ (otherwise). We prove that R % 2 is 
47/48 (=  0.97917). A general algorithm for solving R £ m is presented 
in [17]. We also show that Rsnn is asymptotic to n/2. These results 
respectively extend those for two players given by Alpern and Gal [5], 
and Anderson and Essegaier [7]. The results of this chapter is based on 
my paper [14] and joint work with Alpern and Beck [17].
In Chapter 3, we consider a rendezvous problem on the line with 
the same setting as that in Chapter 2 except that instead of asking for 
the least expected meeting time, we find the minimum time M n required
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to ensure that all the n players can meet together at a single point, 
regardless of their initial placement. We prove that M 2 is 3, M3 is 4 and 
that Mn is asymptotic to n/2. We also consider a variant of this problem 
which requires players who meet to stick together and show that with 
this limitation on the players’ motions, three players require five time 
units to ensure a meeting. This chapter presents the minimax version 
of the rendezvous search problem, which has hitherto been studied only 
in terms of minimizing the expected meeting time. The results of this 
chapter will appear in [18].
In Chapter 4, we study a problem proposed by Alpern, in his joint 
paper with Beck [4] of how two players can optimally rendezvous while at 
the same time evading an enemy searcher. We model this problem as a 
two-person, zero-sum game between the rendezvous team R  (with agents 
Rij R 2 ) and the searcher S. This chapter gives the first solution to such 
a rendezvous-evasion game by considering a version which is discrete in 
time and space, as in a pure rendezvous problem of Anderson and Weber 
[8]. The three players # 1, R 2 and S  start at different locations among 
n identical locations and no two of them share a common labelling of 
the locations. At each integer time they can either stay where they 
are or move to any one of the other locations until some location is 
occupied by more than one player, at which time the game ends. If S  is 
at this location, S  (maximizer) wins and the payoff is 1; otherwise the 
rendezvous team R  (minimizer) wins and the payoff is 0. The value of 
the game is the probability that S  wins under optimal play. We assume 
that the agents Ri and R 2 can jointly randomize their strategies. The 
case where the agents are restricted to use the same mixed strategy is 
considered in a separate paper with Alpern [6], and has not been included 
here. When n equals 3, the value of the game is 47/76 (~  0.61842).
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When n equals 4, the value is at least 31/54 («  0.57407). If in addition, 
the players share a common notion of a directed cycle containing all the 
n locations (while still able to move between any two locations), the 
value of the game is ((1 — 2/ n )n_1 +  l ) / 2. Comparing the values of 
this game for n equal 3 and 4 with those of their counterparts described 
above (without common knowledge of the directed cycle), we find that 
this extra information helps the rendezvous team secure a lower value 
in both instances. In the final section, we compare some of the results 
obtained in this chapter with that in [16], which models the rendezvous- 
evasion game as a multi-stage game with observed actions (the results 
in the paper has not been included in this thesis). In all cases that 
we consider, the announcement of actions at the end of each step by 
all players either do not change the value of the game, or is favourable 
towards the rendezvous team, helping them achieve a lower value.
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C h a p t e r  2
R e n d e z v o u s  S e a r c h  O n  T h e  
L i n e  W i t h  M o r e  T h a n  T w o  
P l a y e r s
2.1 In tro d u ctio n
In this chapter, we extend the study of rendezvous search on the line to 
rc (>  3) players. This is motivated by one of the questions raised in [1]. 
In general, when two (or more) players meet (before the game ends) they 
may exchange information about where they have been and who they 
have met (which is their private information) so that the rendezvous 
search problem with more than two players exhibits an added dimension 
of complexity.
At the start of the game, n players are placed by a random permu­
tation onto the integers 0 to (n — 1) on the line and each is pointed 
randomly to the left or right. The players thus have no common notion 
of a positive direction along the line. They move at speed at most one, 
exchanging information freely with those they meet until the game ends,
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which is the first time when ra (2 <  m  < n) of them are at a single point. 
We denote this class of games by r n)Tn. The objective of the players is to 
meet in the least expected time. We denote the asymmetric and symmet­
ric rendezvous values for the problem r n?m as R * m and R^ m respectively. 
When n equals ra equals 2, it has been proved that R 2 2  =  13/8 [5] and 
R 2 2  <  2.28388 [7]. The upper bound has since been improved upon by 
V. Baston [9].
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we formalize the 
framework for the asymmetric version of the rendezvous search problem 
T3,2- We further illustrate this framework in Section 2.3 by considering 
a particular strategy triple. In Section 2.4, we establish an optimality 
condition which we use in Section 2.5 to devise an algorithm, which allows 
us to compute the value of R£ 2 and find all optimal strategy triples. 
We prove that R% 2 is 47/48. Although most of the work concentrates 
on 3-player rendezvous, similar results can be extended to the general 
asymmetric rendezvous search problem Tn?2 [17]. In Section 2.6, we apply 
a modified version of the algorithm established in Section 2.5 to the 
rendezvous problem 1^ 2,2- The intent of this section is to provide an 
alternative proof of the result R 2 2 =  13/8 first proven in [5]. Lastly, in 
Section 2.7, we analyze the rendezvous problem r n)n for large n and show 
that both rendezvous values are asymptotic to n / 2 .
2.2 F orm ulation  o f  ^  2
We consider the asymmetric version of the rendezvous search problem 
r 3)2 where two of the three players are required to meet for the game to 
end. At the start of the game, players 1, 2 and 3 are placed randomly on 
the real line at unit distance apart. Each player is equally likely to be
19
CJi =
pointed in either directions so that the players do not have a common no­
tion of a positive direction along the line. We may represent the progress 
of the game on a Cartesian plane, where the horizontal axis denotes time, 
and the vertical axis denotes the position of the player on the real line. 
For i = 1,2,3, the initial position 7r^  of player i is such that (7Ti, 7t2, 7t3) is 
a random permutation of the integers 0, 1,2 and the initial orientation 
oji of player i is defined as
+1 if player i is pointing in the upward 
direction at the start of the game,
— 1 if player i is pointing in the downward 
direction at the start of the game.
The set C containing all elements c =  (7Ti,7r2, 7r3,u>i,u>2,^ 3) denotes the 
set of all possible ways that the game may begin. We refer to the el­
ements of C as cases. We observe that a game which begins as case 
(7r i ,7r2, 7T3,- l ,u > 2, ^ 3) proceeds in exactly the same way as one which 
begins as (2 — 7Ti,2 — 7r2,2 — 7r3, + 1, — u>2, — u;3). For example, Figures 
2.1a and 2.1b show the games starting as cases (1, 0, 2, —1,-(-1, —1) and 
(1,2,0, + 1, - 1, + 1) on the Cartesian plane. And we see that one can be 
obtained from the other by reflecting the strategy curves of the players 
about the time axis, followed by a translation of two units along the po­
sition axis. Hence, we shall assume that = +1 and thus the set C has 
24(= 3! x 22) elements. Clearly, the game ends when the player initially 
placed at position 1 meets either the player initially placed at position 0 
or the player initially placed at position 2, or when all three players meet 
at the same time. We shall later see that the last scenario is not possible
20
when all the players move optimally.
position
2
Player 2
Player 11
Player 30
time
position
Player 3
Player 1
Player 2
time
Figure 2.1a: Case (1,0,2, — 1, +1, — 1) Figure 2.1b: Case (1,2 ,0 , +1, — 1, +1)
A strategy triple for the rendezvous problem 1^2 is given by {/,<?,/&} 
where Player 1 uses strategy path / ,  Player 2 uses strategy path g and 
Player 3 uses strategy path h. Each of / ,  g , h is chosen from the set P  
which consists of paths with speed bounded by one, i.e.,
P  =  { p  : 5ft+  — > 5 f t ,p (0 )  =  0 ,  | p ( * i )  -  p ( t 2 ) |  <  |*2 -  * i | } -
Let Tc( f ,g ,h )  denote the meeting time that corresponds to case c; it is 
the first time that two distinct players occupy the same point on the line.
The expected meeting time T ( f ,g ,h )  is thus
T { f , 9 , h )  =  l r . Y , U f , 9 , h ) ,
cec
and the asymmetric rendezvous value R£ 2 is given by
^ 3,2 =  ^  T( f ,  g,  h). (2.1)
The existence of the minimum in equation (2.1) and of an optimal strat­
egy triple is assured as Tc (and thus T) is lower semi-continuous in its
21
variables and P  is a compact set under the topology of uniform con­
vergence on compact intervals. Given any strategy triple { /,# , h}, it 
is always possible to construct the following eight curves so that every 
Tc( f , g , h ) can be represented as the time when some two particular curves 
intersect:
L 0 ,a{t) = ah(t),
= <*f(t) +  1,
L 2 ,a(t ) = +  2>
L 3 ,a(t) = ah(t) +  3, a  = ± 1. (2.2)
More specifically, recall that the game ends when either (i) the player
initially placed at position 0 meets the player initially placed at position
1, or (ii) the player initially placed at position 1 meets the player initially 
placed at position 2. Thus Tc( / ,  g , h) is the minimum of the two intersec­
tion times of two pairs of associated curves. For example, corresponding 
to case (1,2,0, -4-1, —1,+1) depicted in Figure 2.1b, the two pairs of as­
sociated curves are (Lo,i,iu,i) and (Zu,i, 2/2,-i)> whose meeting times 
correspond to the meeting times of Player 1 with Player 3, and Player 1 
with Player 2 respectively. We abbreviate the pair of curves associated 
with case (1,2,0, + 1, —1, +1) as (0, +1), (1, +1) and (1, + 1), (2, —1). The 
relationship between all the cases and the associated pairs of curves are 
given in Table 2.1 below (case (1 ,2 ,0 ,+ 1 , —1,+1) explained above is 
listed as case cn).
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c G C (7ri,7r2,7r3,wi,u;2,W3) Two Pairs of curves associated with c
Cl (o 1 2 +1 4 + 1) (1,-PI), 2,41) (2,41) (3,41
C2 (o 1 2 +1 4 —1) (1,+1), 2,41) (2,41) (3 ,-1
c 3 (0 1 2 +1 — 41 ) (1,+1), 2 , -1 ) (2,-1) (3,41
C4 (0 1 2 +1 — — 1) ( l .+ l ) . 2,-1 ) (2,-1) (3 ,-1
5^ (0 2 1 +1 4 +1) (0,-1), 1 ,-1) (2,-1) (3 ,-1
Q> (0 2 1 +1 4 —1) (0,4-1), 1 ,-1) (2,-1) (3,41
c 7 (0 2 1 +1 — +1) (0,-1), 1 ,-1) (2,41) (3 ,-1
C8 (o 2 1 +1 — — 1) (0,4-1), 1 ,-1) (2,41) (3,41
C9 (1 2 0 +1 4 + 1) (0,41), 1,41) (1,41) (2,41
C10 (1 2 0 +1 4 — 1) (0, - 1), 1,41) (1,41) (2,41
C ll (1 2 0 +1 — + 1) (0,41), 1,41) (1,41) (2,-1
C\2 (1 2 0 +1 — — 1) (0, - 1), 1,41) (1,41) (2 ,-1
Cl3 (1 0 2 +1 4 +1) (0, - 1), 1 ,-1) (1,-1) (2 ,-1
C\4 (1 0 2 +1 + — 1) (0,41), 1 ,-1) (1,-1) (2 ,-1
C15 (1 0 2 +1 — 41) (0, - 1), 1 ,-1) (1,-1) (2,41
C16 (1 0 2 +1 — —1) (0,41), 1 ,-1) (1,-1) (2,41
Cl 7 (2 0 1 +1 4 + 1) (0,41), 1,41) (2,41) (3,41
Cl8 (2 0 1 +1 4 —1) (0, - 1), 1,41) (2,41) (3 ,-1
Cl9 (2 0 1 +1 — 41) (0,41), 1,41) (2,-1) (3,41
C20 (2 0 1 +1 — —1) (0, - 1), 1,41) (2,-1) (3 ,-1
C21 (2 1 0 +1 4 +1) (1,-1), 2 , -1 ) (2,-1) (3 ,-1
C22 (2 1 0 +1 + —1) (1,-1) , 2 , -1 ) (2,-1) (3,41
C23 (2 1 0 +1 — +1) (1,-1), 2,41) (2,41) (3 ,-1
C 2 4 (2 1, 0 +1 — —1) (1,-1) , 2,41) (2,41), (3,41
Table 2.1: Cases and Associated Pairs of Curves
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The rationale for presenting Table 2.1 here is two-fold. Firstly, it 
verifies our earlier claim that each Tc( f ,g ,h )  can be represented as an 
intersection point between some two curves. Secondly, this observation 
provides the intuition for the optimality condition, which will be stated 
and proved in Section 2.4.
2.3 S tra teg y  Triple { f , g ,  h}
In this section, we compute the expected meeting time achieved by the 
strategy triple {/,<?, h}, where
Let / (< )
g(t) =
h(t) =  <
t  < € [ 0 , 1],
2 - t  < € [1 ,5 /2 ],
t < € [ 0, 1/ 2],
l - <  < € [ 1/ 2, 2],
< - 3  < €[2 ,5 /2],
< < € [ 0, 1/ 2],
l - <  <€ [1/ 2,3/2],
< - 2  <€ [3/2,5/2],
The strategy triple { /,  g, h} is shown in Figure 2.2. For each case c, we 
obtain the meeting times Tc( f ,  g, h) by taking the minimum of the two 
meeting times of the pairs of associated curves. The set of curves T*|CI(<) 
(k = 0, 1, 2 ,3, a  =  ± 1) as defined in (2.2) for the strategy triple (f , g , h ) 
is shown in Figure 2.3 and the meeting times are summarized in Table
2.2, where cases c, are as defined in Table 2.1 of Section 2.2.
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c e C First Pair of 
Associated Curves
Meeting Time Second Pair of 
Associated Curves
Meeting Time Tc( f ,g ,h )
Cl ( i , + i ) ( 2 , + l ) 1 (2 ,+1) , 3, +1) > 5 / 2 1
C2 (i> + i) ( 2 , + l ) 1 (2 ,+1) , 3 , - 1 ) 1/2 1/2
C3 ( i , + i ) ( 2 , - 1 ) 1/2 ( 2 , - 1 ) , 3, +1) 3/2 1/2
c4 ( i , + i ) ( 2 , - 1 ) 1/2 ( 2 , - 1 ) , 3 , - 1 ) 2 1/2
5^ ( 0 , - 1 ) ( 1 , - 1 ) 1 ( 2 , - 1 ) , 3 , - 1 ) 2 1
6^ (0 ,+ 1) ( 1 , - 1 ) 1/2 ( 2 , - 1 ) , 3 ,+ 1 ) 3/2 1/2
C? ( 0 , - 1 ) ( 1 , - 1 ) 1 (2 ,+1) , 3 , - 1 ) 1/2 1/2
C8 (0, + 1) ( 1 , - 1 ) 1/2 (2, +1), +1) > 5 / 2 1/2
eg (0 , + 1) (1, +1) 5 /2 (!>+!)> 2 , + l ) 1 1
ClO ( 0 , - 1 ) (1, +1) >  5 /2 (!>+!)> 2 ,+ 1 ) 1 1
C l l ( o , + i ) (1 ,+ 1 ) 5 /2 (!>+!)> 2 , - 1 ) 1/2 1/2
Cl 2 ( 0 , - 1 ) (1 ,+ 1 ) >  5 /2 ( ! ,+ ! )> 2 , - 1 ) 1/2 1/2
Cl3 ( 0 , - 1 ) ( 1 , - 1 ) 1 ( 1 , - 1 ) , 2 , - 1 ) >  5 /2 1
C14 (0, + 1) ( 1 , - 1 ) 1/2 ( 1 , - 1 ) , 2 , - 1 ) >  5/2 1/2
Cl5 ( 0 , - 1 ) ( 1 , - 1 ) 1 ( 1 , - 1 ) , +1) 2 1
Cl6 ( o , + i ) ( 1 , - 1 ) 1/2 ( 1 , - 1 ) , 2, +1) 2 1/2
C \7 (0, + 1) (1 ,+ 1) 5 /2 ( 2 , + l ) , 3 ,+ 1 ) >  5 /2 5/2
Cl8 ( 0 , - 1 ) (1 ,+ 1 ) >  5/2 ( 2 , + l ) , 3 , - 1 ) 1/2 1/2
Cl9 ( o , + i ) (1 ,+ 1 ) 5 /2 ( 2 , - 1 ) , +1) 3 /2 3/2
C20 ( 0 , - 1 ) (1, + 1) >  5 /2 ( 2 , - 1 ) , 3 , - 1 ) 2 2
C21 ( 1 , - 1 ) ( 2 , - 1 ) >  5 /2 ( 2 , - 1 ) , 3 , - 1 ) 2 2
C22 ( 1 , - 1 ) ( 2 , - 1 ) >  5 /2 ( 2 , - 1 ) , +1) 3 /2 3/2
C23 ( 1 , - 1 ) (2, +1) 2 (2, +1), 3 , - 1 ) 1/2 1/2
C24 ( 1 , - 1 ) ( 2 , + l ) 2 (2, +1), 3 ,+ 1 ) > 5 / 2 2
Table 2.2: Summary of Tc( f ,g ,h )  for all case cG C
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For example, for case cn =  (1 ,2 ,0 ,+ ,—,+ ) , the two pairs of curves 
associated with it are (0, + 1), (1, + 1) and (1, +1), (2 , — 1), which intersect 
at times 5/2 and 1/2 respectively so that TCll( f , g , h) =  1/2. From Table
2.2, it is easy to see that T ( f ,g ,h )  being the average of Tc( f , g ,h ) (for 
all cases c) is 47/48. This result gives rise to the following lemma:
Lem m a 2.1 The asymmetric rendezvous value R% 2 satisfies R%2 < 47/48.
We shall show in Section 2.4 that the asymmetric rendezvous value 
i?3 2 is indeed 47/48, so that the strategy triple { /,g , h} is optimal.
2 .4  A n  O p tim ality  C on d ition
The main objective of this section is to prove a necessary condition for 
a strategy triple to be optimal. Informally, this optimality condition can 
be expressed as follows.
Each player when moving optimally uses some strategy path that is 
linear with slope ±1  between his consecutive meeting times.
We shall see that as a consequence of this necessary condition, we can 
reduce the rendezvous problem r 3)2 to a finite problem. This enables us 
to devise an algorithm in Section 2.5 to compute the value of R £2m
For any strategy triple { /,# , h}, let T ( /,g , h) denote the set of meet­
ing times Tc( f ,g ,h )  for all c in C, i.e.,
r ( f , g , h )  =  {Tc( f , g , k ) , c e C } .
Since only some of Tc( /, <7, h) involve the meeting of player i with another 
player, we use T ;(/, g , h) to denote this subset of T ( / ,  g , h). The following 
lemma asserts that if two strategy triples {/,<?, h} and { f ' , g \  h'} are such 
that they differ only along the path of player i at times not in T t ( /,  g , h),
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then the strategy triple { f \ g \ h ' }  cannot be worse than the strategy 
triple { /,# , h}, i.e., T (f ' ,g ' ,h ')  is at most T ( f ,g ,h ) .  One implication of 
this lemma is that if we modify any strategy triple { /, g , h} along the 
path of one player (say i) off times in Ti(/,<7, /*)> the expected meeting 
time would not increase with such modifications. We shall later apply 
this lemma in the proof of the optimality condition.
L em m a 2.2  Suppose {/,<?, h} and { /',< /, h'} are strategy triples which 
agree except for the ith player, and that the strategy paths of player i agree 
for all times t in Y {(f ,g ,h ) .  Then Tc( f rig,,h') is at most Tc(f ,g ,  h) for  
all c in C.
Proof:
Given any c in C, if Tc( / ',  <7' , /i') does not involve player i meeting 
some other player, Tc( / ' ,g',h*) is equals to Tc( f ,g ,h )  since the strategy 
triples agree off the path of player i. If Tc( / ',  g', h') involves player *, 
then since the strategy triple { f ' ,g ' ,h f} agrees with the strategy profile 
{ f ,g ,h }  for all times t in T t( /,# , h), Tc( / ',  g', h') is at most Tc(f,g ,h ) .  
□
Now we are ready to state the optimality condition formally.
T h e o rem  2.1  Any optimal strategy triple { /,^ , h} satisfies the following 
condition:
Each player i moves with a strategy path that is linear with 
slope ±1  between consecutive meeting times in Y i ( f ,g ,h ) .  (2.3)
27
Proof:
Without loss of generality, assume that /  (the strategy of player 1) 
fails condition (2.3) in the time interval [t\,t2], t i , t 2 in Y i( / ,  #, h). If Li,a, 
Z/2,/? are the two paths responsible for the meeting time t 2 (=  Tc>(f,g,h) 
for some case c'), then Zu,a (£i) < L 2 fp(ti). Modify the path Zq>a to L it0e 
(and thus strategy /  to / )  in the time interval [ti,t2] in the following 
manner: L iiCX moves ‘upwards’ at speed one until time t2(< t2) when the
A ___ A ___
paths £i,a(-) and L2,/?(-) meet (i.e., Tc'( f ,g ,h )  = t '2 < t 2 =  Tc' ( f ,g ,h )), 
after which Li,a(-) follows the trajectory of L2ip(-) to ensure reaching 
^i,a(^2)(=  L 2 ip(t2)) by time t 2. Since /  and /  agree on all times t in 
T *(/,g,h), by the above lemma, Tc( f ,g ,h )  < Tc( f ,g ,h )  for all c in C. 
In particular, our modification guarantees that Tci( f ,g ,h )  < Tc/(/, g, h). 
Hence the strategy triple { /,# , h} cannot be optimal. This is illustrated 
in Figure 2.4a. Likewise, if Zqta, Lo,7 are the two paths responsible for 
the meeting time t 2 =  Tc>(f,g,h), we have Li,a(t\) > L0l7(ti). Here, 
we modify the path Zq)Ce to L\,a (and hence strategy /  to / )  in the 
time interval m  following manner: Li,a moves ‘downwards’ at
speed one until time t 2(< t2) when the paths 2/i,a(*) and Lo,7(') meet 
with Tc>(f,g,h) =  t 2 < t 2 = Tc( / ,  g, h). After which, Li,a (•) follows the 
trajectory of L0,7(-) to ensure reaching LiyCt(t2)(= L 0 n (t2)) by time t2. 
Again, Tc( /,# ,f i)  <  Tc( f ,g ,h )  for all c in C and Tc>(J,g,h) < Tc>{f,g,h). 
Hence the result holds. □
One implication of the above theorem is that it is not optimal for any 
player to stay still, and so when moving optimally, the scenario where all 
three players meet at the same time at a single point on the line is not 
possible. As a corollary, the following result further limits the type of 
movement that any player can adopt when moving optimally. It states 
that each player changes its direction of movement only at times which
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are integer multiples of 1/2.
C o ro lla ry  2.1 Suppose { /, g, /i} is an optimal strategy triple. Let to = 0 
and t\ < t 2 < . . .  < tK be the natural ordering of the elements of 
T ( f ,g ,h ) .  Then for each i =  1 ,2 ,... ,/e , we have the following state­
ments:
S\(i) : 21 { is an integer.
S2(i) : \Lk,a(ti) — Lk+i,p(ti)\ is an integer V k £ {0,1,2}, a, (3 £ {±1}-
Proof:
We proceed by proving the joint statement S(i)  using induction on i. 
When i =  0, by definition, t 0  =  0 so 2to =  0 is an integer and 5i(0) holds.
At time to =  0, the players are placed at positions 0, 1 and 2 respectively, 
so £2(0) holds. Assume that S(i) is true for some i. Then S 2 (i) being 
true implies that \Lk,a(L) ~  Lk+itp(ti)\ is an integer for all k, a, /?. By 
Theorem 2.1, every player moves at speed one till meeting occurs. As a 
result, 2 (t{+i — 1 {) is an integer. By our assumption that Si(i) holds, we
know that 21 { is an integer. Hence, so is 2t,-+i. This proves Si(i +  1).
Since therorem 2.1 says that when players search optimally, they move 
at speed one between the time interval [£»,£,■+1], the distance between the 
players is either (i)preserved (if they move in the same direction), or (ii) 
increased by 2 (ti+i — L) (if they move away from each other), or (iii) 
decreased by 2(£,+i — L) (if they move towards each other). Hence, for 
all k , a , /?,
|f'A:,a(^t+l) -^fc+l,/?( t^+l)| | ■ f ' f c + l , / ? ^ * ) |  — i2(t,'_j-j tfj Or 0.
Rearranging the terms, we have
=^ 2(f;+i ft) “I- |Lk,a{ti) Lk+\,p{ti)| or
\Lk,a{ fi )  L k + l t( j( t i )  |.
(2.4)
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Since we are assuming that S ^ i) holds, \Lk,a(U) — Lk+i,p(t{)\ is an integer 
for all k,a,/3. Also, we have shown above that 2(£,+i — t{) is an integer. 
It is thus clear from (2.4) that \Lk,a(U+i) ~  Lk+i,p{U+i)\ is an integer, 
and so we establish +  1). 1=1
Combining the results of Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.1, we have the 
following conclusion on the properties of any optimal strategy triple.
C o ro lla ry  2.2 Any optimal strategy triple { /,# , h} is such that each 
player moves with a strategy path that has slope +1 or —1 and changes 
direction only at times that are integer multiples of 1/2.
Proof:
The result is immediate from Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.1. □
2.5  A n  A lgorith m  To F in d  R%2
In the previous section, we established a necessary condition for opti­
mality: Each player follows speed one paths and changes direction only 
between his consecutive meeting times. As a corollary, we reduce the set 
of potential optimal paths to those speed one paths which change direc­
tion only at times which are integer multiples of 1/2; this is summarised 
in Corollary 2.2. In this section, we apply this corollary to devise an algo­
rithm  to find all optimal strategy triples and the asymmetric rendezvous 
value /?3j2-
Let s(fc) denote a potential optimal strategy triple defined up to time 
(k +  l)/2 . We know from Corollary 2.2 that each player has to move 
with speed one paths which change direction only at times which are 
integer multiples of 1/2. In other words, we can describe s(k) by merely 
specifying if it changes direction at times which are integer multiples of 
1/2. If we assume without loss of generality that all players move in the
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initial direction that they are pointing (given by as defined in
Section 2.2) for the time interval [0,1/2], we can write s(k) as a 3 x A; 
m atrix such that for i =  1,2,3 and j  =  1 ,2 ,...,& ,
Sij(k) = <
+1 if Player i continues in his previous 
direction during the time interval 
—1 if Player i changes his direction of 
motion during the time interval [J,
At time ji/2 (j  > 1), S{j(k) indicates if player i changes direction in the 
next 1/2 unit of time. As an example, we illustrate in Figure 2.5 the 
strategy triple represented by the 3 x 2  matrix
*(2) =
'  1 - l '
- 1  1
- 1  -1
Given a fixed k , the total number of possible -s(fc)’s is 2 3k. Clearly, if 
the players use a strategy triple s(fc) which defines the strategy paths up 
to time (k +  l)/2 , we would only be able to determine if the game has 
ended by time (k +  l)/2 , and nothing can be said about what happens 
after that. Thus, for all c 6 C, let
T(c,s(k)) =
t if the game ends at time t (<  (k +  l)/2 ), 
oo otherwise.
Let T*(c, s(fc)) = min(T(c, s(k)), (k -fi l) /2  +  1/2). One may interpret 
T(c,s(k))  as the actual meeting time when s(k) is used, assuming that 
all players stay still from time (k +  l) /2  onwards. T*(c, s(k)) may then 
be taken as the best possible meeting time achievable by the strategy 
triple s(k), since if the game has not ended by time (k +  l)/2 , the most 
optimistic estimate of the actual meeting time is (k +  l) /2  +  1/2. This 
is because we have seen from Corollary 2.1 that all meeting times are
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integer multiples of 1/2 when players search optimally. Let M(s(k))  be 
an indicator of whether the game has ended by time (k +  l) /2  for all 
twenty four cases when strategy s(k) is used, i.e.,
M{s{k)) =
1 if maxc€c T(c,s(k))  < oo, 
0 otherwise.
For example, M (s(l)) =  0 for all possible s ( l ) ’s since not all cases can 
end at time 1. Note that M(s(k))  =  1 if T(c, s(&)) = T*(c,s(k)) for all 
c e C .
The main idea of the algorithm is that instead of computing the 
expected meeting time for all potential optimal strategy triples (there 
are only finitely many of them as proved in the previous section), we 
compute, at each stage k , the value of ET*(s(k))  (which is the average 
value of T*(c, s(k)) taken over all c in C) for each s(k) and partition these 
s ( k y s into potential optimal triples (i.e. those s ( k y s with ET*(s(k)) not 
exceeding a known upper bound of R ^ 2) and otherwise. Such partition 
at each stage k significantly reduces the number of matrices s(k +  1) 
that one has to consider in subsequent stages. If an s(k) is such that 
ET*(s(k)) is less than the value of the known upper bound of R % 2 and 
M(s(k))  = 1, we replace the current upper bound of R % 2 by Ibis smaller 
value. If an s(k) is such that ET*(s(k))  is not larger than the upper 
bound of f?3 2 and M(s(k)) = 0, we cannot draw any exact conclusion 
about the strategy triple s(k) at stage k (except that it may be optimal) 
and for such s ( k y s, we append an additional (k +  l)th  column to the 
matrix so that it becomes a 3 x (k +  1) matrix and advances into stage 
(k +  1) of the algorithm. Each of these s (k y s can be extended to eight 
possible s(k +  l ) ’s and the algorithm ends when no such s(k) needs to 
be extended. The formal description of the algorithm is given below.
The algorithm is defined in stages such that at each stage k , only
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strategy triples s(fc)’s are considered. Let Bk denote the least upper 
bound for R% 2 obtained by stage k. In Lemma 2.1 we showed that R % 2  
is bounded above by 47/48, so we shall take B 0  to be 47/48 and every 
strategy triple s(k) is a potential optimal strategy triple if ET*(s(k))  is 
at most Bk-1- Let P\ denote the set of all s (l)  matrices (distinct up to 
row permutation). Let Rk denote the subset of Pk where each s(k) in Rk 
has an expected meeting time (or an estimate of it) which is more than 
Bk~i and thus these s(fc)’s cannot be optimal; Rk in essence, contains 
the s ( k y s in Pk that are rejected in stage k. We use Ek to denote the 
subset of Pk where all s(fc)’s in Ek have achieved an expected meeting 
time of at most Bk-i  by stage k (i.e., M(s(k)) = 1 and ET*(s(k))  is at 
most B k-1). For such s(fc)’s, there is no need to consider any extension 
of it as a 3 x (k +  1) matrix since its exact expected meeting time is 
known and we end any further operations on these <s(fc)’s in Ek• Let Ak 
denote the subset of strategy triples s(k) in Pk with M(s(k))  =  0 and 
ET*(s(k)) is at most Bk-1. These s(fc)’s are those strategy triples where 
precise conclusions about their optimality (or the lack of it) cannot be 
drawn. To each of these s(fc)’s (distinct up to row permutation) in Ak, 
we append a (&+ l)th  column to it so that it becomes a 3 x (fc +  1) matrix. 
The set of such s(k  +  l ) ’s that is obtained by extending all s(fc)’s in Ak is 
the set Pjt+i. Pk+i thus constitutes the set of potential optimal strategy 
triples. To summarize, at each stage k , the set Pk is partitioned into the 
sets Rk, Ek and Ak and each s(k) in Ak (distinct up to row permutation) 
is then extended to eight s(k +  l ) ’s which form the set Pk+i that enters 
stage (k +  1). That is,
Ak = {s(k) G Pk ’ ET*(s(k)) < Bk-i  and M(s(k))  =  0},
Rk = {s(k) e  Pk : ET*(s(k)) > B k-!},
Ek =  {s(k)  G Pk : ET*(s(k)) < Bk-1 and M(s(k)) = 1}, and
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B k =  mm{Bk~i , m m s(k)eEk ET*(s(k))}.
The steps involved in the algorithm are summarized in Figure 2.6. We 
apply the algorithm and the result is given in the following theorem.
T h e o re m  2.2 The asymmetric rendezvous value for three person search 
on the line, where two are required to meet, is given by R % 2 =  47/48. Up 
to permutations of the labels of the players, there are six optimal strategy 
triples. These are given in matrix notations as:
{
\
11 - 1  1 
- 1 1  1 - 1  
— 1 1 —1 1  
\  /
1 - 1 1 1
- 1 1 1 1
- 1 1 - 1 1
/ 1 - 1 1 1  
- 1 1 1 1  
- 1  - 1  1 - 1
\
1 - 1 1 - 1  
- 1 1 1 1  
- 1  - 1  1 - 1
1 - 1 1 1  
- 1 1 1 1  
- 1  - 1  - 1  - 1
\
/
1 - 1 1 1  
- 1 1  1 - 1  
- 1  - 1  - 1  - 1
Proof: We implement the above algorithm and the process stops at k =  4, 
with B\  =  47/48. Hence R% 2 =  47/48. A summary of the results is 
given in Table 2.3. In stage 1, P\ has four elements (distinct up to row 
permutation) and two of them are rejected, namely,
v 1 /
and
' - i '
- 1
- 1
The two s ( l ) ’s in the set A\  as shown in Table 2.3 are
5(1) =
•1
and s(l)  = - 1
-1
To further illustrate this algorithm, we shall consider, in particular, what 
happens to s (l)  in the subsequent stages of the algorithm. Eight 3 x 2
34
matrices (representing strategy triples) can be extended from the m atrix 
5(1) and for each of these strategy triple 5(2), the value of ET*(s(2)) 
is computed. All but two (distinct up to row permutation) have an 
estimated expected meeting time exceeding 47/48. The remaining two 
matrices are
( 1 1
1 -1
- 1  1
\
and
(
\
1
1
-1
1
Again, in stage 3, each of these two s(2)’s is extended to eight s(3)’s. 
However, upon computation of the value of ET*(s(3)), it is found that 
all these s(3)’s have estimated expected meeting times larger than 47/48, 
so all of them are rejected from the algorithm and are partitioned into 
the set R 3 . As we can see from Table 2.3, all the s(3)’s in A 3  have their 
first column as
-1
-1
and not 1
-1
The same reasoning follows for 5(1). Eventually, six s(4)’s achieve an 
expected meeting time of 47/48 in stage 4 and no matrix remains in A 4  
so that the algorithm ends at stage 4, giving R % 2 =  47/48.
The six optimal triples obtained are exactly those in the statement of the 
theorem, the first of which corresponds to the strategy triple { f , g , h }  
given in Section 2.3. □
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k  Bk s ( k )  €  Ak | Ek | | Pk+i |
1 47/48
2 47/48
3 47/48
1 '
1
v - 1 /
1 '
- 1
v - 1 /
1 1
1 - 1
- 1 1
1 1 '
-1 1
-1 1
1 -1
- 1 1
- 1 1
1 - 1
- 1  - 1
1 1
- 1  -1
- 1  1
W  1 - i  '
1 - 1 1
-1 1 1
- 1 1 - 1
1 -1 1 '
- 1 1 1
- 1 - 1 1
1 -1 1
- 1 1 1
-1 -1 - 1
- 1  1 
V 1 - 1 /  
\
0 2 x 8 =  16
0 6 x 8 =  48
0 3 x 8 =  24
4 47/48 0 0
Table 2.3: Summary of the results of the Algorithm
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2.6  A sy m m etr ic  2 -P erson  R en d ezv o u s R e­
v is ited
In this section, we provide an alternative approach to finding the value 
of R%2 (which was first obtained in [5]) by applying a revised version of 
the algorithm described in Section 2.5.
At the start of the game, two players are placed randomly at positions 
0 and 1 randomly and they are equally likely to be pointed in either 
directions. As in three-person rendezvous, we use nt- and u t- to denote 
the initial position and orientation of each player. For the same reason as 
given in Section 2.2, we assume without loss of generality that u>\ = +1 
so that there are four (2! x 2) ways that the game may begin, given by 
the set {(7Ti,7r2,cdi,w2) : {^1,^ 2} =  {0,1},^ i =  +l,u>2 € {+ 1 ,-1 } } . As 
before, Pi is the set of all s (l)  matrices, and in this case where n = 2, 
Pi consists of the 2 x 1  matrices (distinct up to row permutations)
v - 1 /
and
-1
-1
The sets Rk , Ek , Ak and Pk are defined as before, except that every 
s(k) in Ak when extended, gives rise to four s(k +  l ) ’s. Bk is again 
the least upper bound obtained by stage k. And in order to be able to 
apply the algorithm more efficiently, the optimistic estimate T*(c, s(k)) is 
varied depending on the number of cases c with T(c,s(k))  =  00. This is 
because in 2-person rendezvous, each case must have an unique meeting 
time. This observation is based on Theorem 3 of [5]. Note that this, 
however, need not be the case for n-person rendezvous, if n is strictly 
greater than 2. For example, in Table 2.2, we see that TC2( f ,g ,h )  = 
TC3( f ,g ,h )  =  1/2. In addition, an analogue of Corollary 2.1 for n-person 
rendezvous is proved in [17]: That the meeting times are integer multiples
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of 1/2. As a consequence, we know that each meeting time differs from 
the others by z / 2, £ being a positive integer. As an example, if T(c, s(k)) 
is equals to infinity for all the four cases, the meetings occur earliest 
at times (k +  l) /2  -f 1/2, (k +  l) /2  -f 2 x 1/2, (k +  l) /2  +  3 x 1/2 
and (k + l) /2  +  4 x 1/2 respectively and ET*(s(k)) is thus taken to be 
(k +  l) /2  +  5/4.
Let (ji =
V
, 0 2  =
/ 1
- 1
,03
- 1
1
, 0"4 —
v - 1 /
Use (ui, u2, . . . ,  Uk) to denote a 2 x k matrix obtained by appending crUk 
to the matrix given by (tti, u2, . . . ,  ujt-i)- For example, (1,2,3) denotes 
the matrix
Suppose we take Bo to be 13/8, which is the expected meeting time when 
strategy pair (2 ,3 ,1 ,2 ,1) is used (this is obtained from [5]). At stage 1, 
we need only to consider matrices (1), (2) and (4) since (2) and (3) are 
identical under row permutation. Due to constraint of space, we show 
only part of the analysis on a tree diagram in Figure 2.7 where all the 
branches and nodes are labelled. For example, a node that arises from 
branches with labels u i ,u 2, . . .  t at stage k and labelled t means that 
the node represents ET*((u i , u2, . . . ,  u*)) =  t. For example, node Q at 
the end of stage two means that ET*(( 1,1)) =  2, and since B\  =  13/8, 
(1,1) belongs to the set R2. Upon implementation of the algorithm it is 
found that Ek = 0 for k = 1 ,2 ,3 ,4  and A 5 = 0, which means that an 
optimal strategy must be a 2 x 5 matrix. Indeed, there are two of them, 
given by (2 ,3 ,1 ,2 ,1) and (2 ,4 ,1 ,2 ,1) (Figures 2.8a and 2.8b).
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2 .7  S ym m etric  n -P erson  R en d ezv o u s
We now consider the problem r njn faced by n players who must all meet 
at a single point in the least expected time and have to use the same 
mixed strategy (if they used the same pure strategy, then if all of them 
were initially pointed in the same direction the distance between adjacent 
players would forever remain as one, and they would never meet in this 
case). We observe that in this situation, two players upon meeting may 
exchange any information known to either of them at the time.
The aim of this section is to establish that the symmetric rendezvous 
value R sn n is asymptotic to rc/2. It is clear that the rendezvous time T  
can never be less than (n — l ) / 2 , since the distance between the players 
who are initially placed at positions 0 and (n — 1) is already (n — 1) 
at the start of the game. So the problem is to find a mixed strategy 
which if universally adopted produces an expected rendezvous time (for 
all players to meet) of n /2  +  K , for some constant K  independent of n. 
The following mixed strategy (given behaviorally) achieves this aim.
A s tra te g y  fo r sy m m etric  n -p layer rendezvous:
The strategy consists of three stages, which we outline below. In 
these, the word start refers to a player’s initial position, which he will 
always know. However, overriding these actions spelt out in the various 
stages is the following rule:
R u le  1 : If someone you meet says ‘follow me’, then follow him, i.e., 
adopt the same strategy path.
The three stages of the strategy are as follows.
• Stage 1: Pick a random direction, independently and equiprobably 
each time. Go a distance 1/2 at speed one in that direction and 
then return to start. Then go a distance 1/2 (again with speed one)
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in the opposite direction and return to start. This takes a total time 
of 2, and you are back at start at all integer times. Repeat until 
you are back at start and have met another player. Then proceed 
to Stage 2.
•  Stage 2: Go at speed one a maximum distance one in the direction 
away from that in which you have met another player at Stage 1. 
If you meet another player during this time, return immediately to 
your starting point and wait. If after one unit of time and you have 
not met another player, then proceed to Stage 3.
• Stage 3: Proceed at unit speed towards and then past start, contin­
uing until the game ends, instructing everyone you meet to follow 
you.
Figure 2.9 shows a typical set of paths resulting from the use of this 
strategy where all but the player at position 4 is pointed downwards 
initially (n is 5 in this instance). In this figure, the paths of the players 
never cross over, though they may merge. So the paths can be read, 
labelling the players according to their initial positions. Consider player 
1. He meets player 0 at time 2.5, so for him Stage 1 ends (and Stage
2 begins) at time 3. At time 3, he is at his initial position and he goes 
away from where he met player 0 towards player 2 , who he meets at 
time 3.5. Since he has now met someone on either side, he returns to his 
start and waits. At time 6, player 0 tells him to follow, and he does. At 
time 6.5, everyone meets at position 1.5 on the line. Next look at player 
4. At time 2, Stage 2 begins for him. He goes one unit in the upwards 
direction (away from where he met player 3). Finding nobody there, he 
knows that he is an end-player so he reverses and picks up players 2 and
3 until he gets to position 1.5 on the line with everyone else at time 6.5.
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The basic idea of this strategy is that the two players at the ends (i.e., 
with initial positions at 0 and (n — 1) respectively) realize that they are 
the end-players by local interaction. They then proceed towards each 
other, gathering up everyone during the process.
The analysis of the expected meeting time is straightforward. Let all 
the chance moves, by Nature in picking the initial positions and initial 
orientations of the players be denoted by 0 in 0 . Let ti = U(0) denote 
the time when player i (the player who starts at position i) leaves Stage 
1. That is, t{ is the first time that player i is at his start after having 
met an adjacent player at time ti —1/2 (if this adjacent player is in Stage 
1) or at time ti (if this adjacent player is in Stage 2). If no player ever 
meet, then all the ti s are infinity, but this event has probability zero. In 
Figure 2.9, t0 is 3 and tn-1 (=  t4) is 2. Note that for all i, | ti — 2t+1 |<  1 
and hence by induction | to — tn-1 |<  n — 1.
To compute the time T  (=  T(0)) required for all the players to meet, 
we focus our attention on the two end players 0 and n — 1. Observe that 
player 0 is at position —1 at time to + 1 and player (n — 1) is at position n 
at time t n_ i +  1. This follows from the definition of the Stage 2 strategy, 
since their first meetings are with players 1 and (n — 2) respectively. By 
the definition of the Stage 3 strategy, player 0’s position po(t)  at time t  
(>  o^ +  l) is given by po(t)  = —l + t  — ( t0 + l)  and player (n — l ) ’s position 
pn- i ( t )  at time t  (>  t n- 1 +  1) is given by pn- i ( t )  =  n -  (t  -  ( tn_ x +  1)). 
It follows that these two players meet (together with all other players) 
at the time T  when po(t)  equals pn_i(£), or
jy _  U +  3 +  £p +  tn- l  
2
Denoting the expected value of T  by E(T)  and the expected value of t0
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(and also £n_i) by E(to)  we have the estimate
K , n < E(T)  =  ^  +  E(to). (2.5)
To estimate the value E(to) ,  let denote the random variable to in the 
case for n equals 2, or equivalently the meeting time of player 0 with 
player 1 when the motion of player 1 is unaffected by players initially 
placed at positions other than 0 and 1. Thus gives an overestimate of 
to since any meeting of player 1 with player 2 will in the actual situation 
send player 1 for any earlier meeting with player 0. Let E * denote the 
expected value of t J. Clearly equals 1 with probability 1/4 and equals 2 
with probability 1 /4. Given that is strictly greater than 2, its expected 
value is 2 +  E*.  Hence E* satifies the equation
E * =  j x l + i x 2  +  l(2  +  £*),or £* =  7-  > E(t0).
It now follows from (2.5) that
K , n < E ( T ) < ^ - + 7-  = ^  + 5.
To obtain a lower bound on first observe that even if all the players 
see each other, it takes at least time (n — l )/2  for them to meet at their 
center of mass. Thus (n — l)/2  is a lower bound. However, since players 
0 and (n — 1) cannot meet anyone on the first 1/2 unit of time (and hence 
cannot receive any information during this time), it follows (by pairing 
cases with the player at 0 pointing upward and downward) that for any 
strategy, the expected distance between these two players at any time t  
(<  1/2) is the same as their initial distance, n — 1. Hence, even if all 
positions are revealed at time 1/ 2, it will still take an expected additional 
time (n — l) /2  for them to meet. As a result, 1/2 +  (n — l) /2  (=  n / 2) 
is a lower bound for the expected meeting time and also for the least 
expected meeting time R sn n. Combining our upper and lower bounds on 
we obtain the following result.
42
T h e o rem  2.3 The least expected time R snn required for n (>2)  players 
to meet togther using identical mixed strategies, starting from a a random 
placement on the integers 0 to (n —1), is asymptotic to n / 2. In particular, 
it satifies the inequality
(The same bounds obviously hold also for R“n since it is less than R sn n 
and also satisfies the lower bound).
We conclude with a few remarks regarding the bounds obtained for R snn . 
First, these bounds are not the best possible. In fact the techniques 
used to obtain these can get better bounds. But since this requires much 
more time (and paper), and still does not get the two bounds equal, we 
adopt the current treatment. For n equals 2, the given bounds place 
R 2 2 between 1 and 6, whereas the strategy of Anderson and Essegaier 
[7] gives the bound 2 <  2.29. Of course the bound of 6 is not the true 
expected meeting time for our strategy when n equals 2, since in this 
instance T  = to — 0.5 (the first time the two players meet) which has 
expected value E * — 0.5 (= 3).
For n equals 3, our bounds place R| 3 between 1.5 and 6.5. However 
this upper bound can be lowered by the addition of the following Rule 2 
to our strategy: ‘If on your first meeting with another player you learn 
(from that player) that there are n — 1 players to one side of you, then 
proceed in that direction, telling everyone you meet to follow you. That 
is, skip Stage 2 and go directly to Stage 3’. In the case when n equals 
3, this rule definitely applies to either player 0 or player 2. To calculate 
the expected meeting time T, we consider that following equally likely 
scenarios at time zero (all players are using the same mixed strategy).
Scenario 1: All three players move in the same direction.
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Scenario 2: Player 0 and Player 2 move towards each other.
Scenario 3: Two adjacent players move towards each other while the 
third player (at one of the ends) moves in the direction away from 
them.
Scenario 4: Player 0 and Player 2 move in opposite directions away from 
each other.
Using Ti (i =  1,2,3,4) to denote the expected meeting time for each of 
the scenarios, we observe that no meeting between any players is possible 
in the first 2 units of time in Scenario 1 so that T\ =  T  +  2. We analyze 
the game in the other three scenarios in Figure 2.10 and we have r2 =  3.3, 
r3 =  3.0 and 74 =  4.25. In Scenario 4, player 0 is equally likely to move 
upwards or downwards at time 2. This randomization means that the 
expected meeting time r4 is l/2(4.0 +  4.5) (=  4.25). Thus,
1 4 
i s *^ i=i
\ ( T  +  2 +  3.5 +  3 +  4.25)
4
4.25.
Hence, R33 <  4.25.
As n becomes large, the probability of Rule 2 coming into force (for 
player 0 or (n — 1)) becomes negligible. Note that our original strategy 
(without Rule 2) does not require that the players know the value of n, 
so that it is an effective strategy when the number of players is unknown.
In the next chapter, we consider a variant of the rendezvous search 
problem where instead of minimizing the expected meeting time, players 
wish to guarantee meeting within the shortest time regardless of their 
initial placement. As in this chapter, we focus on the case where the 
search region is the real line.
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Strategy path
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Figure 2.2: Strategy Triple {f,g,h}
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>  time
1/2 3/2 5/2
-  1/2
Figure 2.3: Curves Lkj(f) (k=0,l,2,3, i=+ l,-l) for strategy triple {f,g,h}
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time
Figure 2.4 a: Illustration for the proof of theorem 2.1
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Figure 2.4b: Illustration for the proof of theorem 2.1
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Figure 2.5: Strategy triple represented by s(2)
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f  1 > r - nl l 1l > l 5 -1 > - i1 1 , I-l J l- l  J l - i  J
Begin with k=l;
k = k +  1;
No
Yes
No
Is M(s(k)) = 1 ?
Yes
End
Compute M(s(k))
Compute ET*(s(k))
s(k) g  E k;
Bk = , m in ^ )^  ET* (s(k)))
A k  extended to P k+1
Figure 2.6: Flow Chart For The Algorithm
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(13/8)(13/8) Stage 2
Stage 3
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Stage 4
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( 13/8) (7/4)
□  if s(k) is in Ak
if s(k) is in Rk 
O  if s(k) is in Ek
Figure 2.7: Tree Diagram Showing The Computation of R^
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Figure 2.8 a: Optimal strategy pair (2,3,1,2,1)
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1/2 1/2
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Figure 2.8 b: Optimal strategy pair (2,4,1*2,1)
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T — 2.5 +  2 ( ^ 0  +  ^ 4  +  3)  — 6.5
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Figure 2.9: A typical instance of the symmetric n-person 
rendezvous strategy (n=5)
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4 time
Scenario 2: Players 0 and 2 move 
towards each other at time 0
position
4 time
Scenario 3: Players 1 and 2 move 
towards each othher; while Player 0 
moves away from 1 at time 0
position
x4 = |(4 .0  + 4.5) = 4.25
— >  Scenario 4: Players 0 and 2 move
5 time away from each other at time 0
Figure 2.10: Computation of meeting times Ti(i = 2,3,4)
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C h a p t e r  3
M i n i m a x  R e n d e z v o u s  O n  
T h e  L i n e
3.1 In trod u ction
In this chapter we ask how much time is needed to ensure that n play­
ers, placed randomly onto consecutive integers on the line, can all meet 
together at a single point. We assume that they cannot see each other 
and can move at unit speed. We also assume that they have no common 
notion of a positive direction on the line, or equivalently are each placed 
pointing in a random direction. This setup is similar in essence to that 
of the rendezvous problem considered in Chapter 2 except that players 
here have a different objective. We seek the minimum time Mn by which 
some n-tuple of strategies guarantees a group meeting regardless of the 
initial placement of the players. For example, it is clear that M 2 <  3 
because if one player remains still while the other goes say one unit to 
the right followed by two to the left, then the meeting time is 1 or 3.
The problem considered here is a search game, and fits into the frame­
work of [10] and [20], except that this problem is far from being zero sum.
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More specifically, the problem that we consider here can be seen as a min­
imax version of the rendezvous search problem [1] which has previously 
been analyzed only in terms of expected time minimization ([1], [5], [8], 
[7], [4], [17] and as in Chapter 2). However there are many applications 
in search theory where expected time minimization is not the most ap­
propriate solution concept, and minimax is one of several others that has 
been studied in various contexts. It seems that minimax is appropri­
ate even in the original rendezvous problem of Schelling [22] where two 
parachutists have to meet after a simultaneous landing in a large field. 
If the overall plan involves their moving out together from this field at 
time ti, then they must be dropped into the field no later than t\ minus 
the minimax rendezvous time. Clearly, the symmetric version of the ren­
dezvous problem (where all players use the same mixed strategy) is not 
appropriate to the minimax context because it allows the possibility that 
all players might use the same pure strategy. (They would never meet in 
the case where they are initially pointed in the same direction.) Hence, 
only the asymmetric version (where players are allowed to use different 
pure strategies) is of interest here.
This chapter finds the first exact value for a full three player ren­
dezvous problem, i.e. the time needed for all three to meet at a single 
point. We do this in a minimax context and find that 4 is the least time 
required to ensure that three players placed at unit distances apart can 
meet, that is M 3  =  4. In order for all three to meet this quickly, the two 
players who first meet must in some cases split up to find the remain­
ing player, before regrouping in a threesome. The problem facing the 
two who meet first is thus similar to that studied in a different context 
([23], [19]).We also consider an important variant of the problem, namely 
“sticky” rendezvous, where players who meet are required to remain to-
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gether. We find that when players’ strategies are thus restricted, they 
need 5 time units to ensure full three player rendezvous. Our final result 
concerns the behavior of Mn for large values of n, the time required for 
large numbers of players to meet. We find that Mn is asymptotic to 
n/2. This asymptotic value is the same as for the least expected time in 
the symmetric problem, as proved in Section 2.7, although of course the 
problem and solution concept are entirely different.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we give a precise 
formulation of the minimax rendezvous problem, in its unrestricted and 
‘sticky’ forms. In Section 3.3 we analyze the two player problem in an 
extended form that will arise for three players after two of them meet.
In particular we establish that M 2 =  3. In Section 3.4 we solve the sticky 
version of the three person problem, proving that sticky players require 
5 time units to guarantee a three way meeting. In Section 3.5 we use 
similar arguments to show that without this restriction three players can 
meet in 4 time units, i.e., M3 =  4. The final Section 3.6 establishes the 
asymptotic result that limn_*oo Mn/n  =  1/2.
3.2  T h e M in im ax  R en d ezvou s T im e
In this section we give the definitions of the n-player rendezvous problems 
r n and the associated minimax rendezvous time Mn. We also define their 
‘sticky’ counterparts, in which players who meet must thenceforth remain 
together.
The problem (or game) Tn begins with a random placement of the n 
players onto the integers 0 ,1, • • • , n —  1 (or equivalently any n consecutive 
integers). The initial position of player i is denoted by 7rwhere {7Ti , 7r2,. . . ,  7rn} 
is equals to { 0 ,1 ,. . . ,  n — 1} . Since the players do not have a common
56
notion of a positive direction on the real line, we assume they are ini­
tially faced in independent random directions. We use to denote the 
direction that player i is initially pointing, from an observer’s fixed global 
view, where cj; (E {+1, —1} • Let C  =  Cn denote the set of all n\2n ini­
tial configurations or cases of the form c =  {7Ti,7T2, . . .  , 7rn,LJi,. . .  ,
where the first n coordinates denote positions, while the next n denote 
directions.
A strategy for player i in the game Tn is a rule that gives his motion 
(relative to his starting point and starting direction) as a function of the 
information he receives from players he may meet. A strategy profile is 
simply an n-tuple of strategies, one for each player. A strategy profile 
together with an initial configuration determines completely the motions 
of all the players. We define Tc to be the first time (if any) that all n 
players following the profile S  meet together at a single point, when the 
initial configuration is case c.
In particular, a strategy for player i must say how that player should 
move before he meets anyone. This part of the strategy is called the 
Stage 1 strategy. A Stage 1 strategy st- is a path with speed bounded by 
one belonging to the set
P = {p : -+ 5ft, p (0) =  0, |p (fi) -  p (t2)| <  |fi -  t21} .
The Stage 1 path of a player following strategy Si when the initial config­
uration is c is given by ni+LJiSi ( t ) . In a recent paper [17] it is shown that 
when inital distances between adjacent players are integers, any strategy 
profile can be modified to one in a subset of P  called P* where play­
ers have piecewise linear paths, with slopes ±1, and which turn only at 
times k / 2 where k is an integer. This modification does not postpone any 
meeting between players, and hence does not postpone the final meeting 
of all the players. For this reason we will further assume that through­
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out the game all players are restricted to paths in P*. Observe that this 
assumption implies that Tc (s') is always half of an integer. A useful 
notational device for describing Stage 1 strategies in P * is simply to list 
the slopes in successive half units of time. Thus s =  [+1 ,— 1, +1, — 1 ,...]  
describes a path that oscillates between its starting point and a point a 
half unit above the start. More generally, if s = [rci, £2,...] then we have 
(with [ ] denoting integer part),
, ,  / 2 t - [ 2 t l \
S (V ~  X m  X [2t]+1 I 2  J ■
771 = 1 \ /
N o te . One should notice that this notation for describing Stage 1 
strategies in P * differs from the convention introduced in Section 2.5. In 
the latter, a strategy triple where all three players adopt the path that 
oscillates between its starting point and a point a half unit above the 
start for the first (k + l) /2  units of time is denoted by a 3 x  k matrix 
where all entries are —1.
One final remark regarding player strategies in Tn is that we may 
assume without loss of generality that they all begin with +1, that is 
they go in the forward direction for the first half unit of time. This 
assumption is valid because it does not restrict the actual player motion, 
since the player may be initially pointed either way.
The maximum rendezvous time for a strategy profile 5, denoted sim­
ply T  (s') is defined as
T  (S)  =  max r c (5) .
Then we may define the minimax rendezvous time Mn as
Mn =  HunT (s') ,
where the minimum is taken over all strategy profiles S. We note that the 
index n does not appear on the right side of the above equation, but of
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course the player number parameter n is implicit in all the definitions in 
this section. The existence of the minimum follows from our assumption 
that all player paths must belong to P*.
In Section 3.4 we will consider a further restriction on player paths, 
namely that when players meet they stick together. All the above def­
initions remain valid, with this assumption. The sticky version of the 
n-player game is denoted f n and the sticky minimax time is denoted 
Mn.
3.3  T w o P layer  M in im ax  R en d ezv o u s
In this section we consider the minimax rendezvous problem on the line 
for the case of two players. In passing, we will prove that the minimax 
rendezvous time for the standard two player problem T2 is 3, but we will 
mainly be concerned with a more general two person problem denoted by 
T (a, (3) . We are forced to consider this more general problem because this 
is what the three player ‘sticky’ problem (discussed in the next section) 
collapses to after two players meet.
The problem T (a,/3) is an asymmetric information rendezvous game 
defined as follows. Player I is placed at some point on the line (which 
we take as the origin 0) and pointed facing up (the line is taken to be 
vertical). Player II is then faced in a random direction either a distance 
a  above player I or a distance (3 below player I (i.e. at a  or at — (3). 
Thus player II knows only that his partner is a distance a  or (3 away, 
while player I knows that his partner is either a  above (forward) or (3 
below. If a = (3 = 1 then the information is symmetric and indeed 
r  (1,1) is the same as the problem we called r 2. If player I chooses a 
strategy Si = f  £ P  and player II chooses a strategy s2 =  g E P  (we
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cannot restrict strategies to P* unless a  and (3 are integers) then the 
maximum rendezvous time T a,@ ( /,  g) is the first time t when the path 
/  (t ) has intersected the four paths given below.
Zi{t)  = a  — g ( t ) ,
Z2 (t) = a  + g ( t ) ,
£ 3 (0  =
Z4 (t) ~  — (3-\-g(t).
That is, T a,f3 ( / ,  g) is the maximum of tj = tj ( / ,  g) =  min {t : /  (t) = Zj (£)}, 
\fj = 1 , . . . ,  4. The minimax rendezvous time for T (a, /?) is the minimum 
o { T ^ ( f , g )  , V ( f , g ) e P x P .
Note that any strategy pair ( / ,  g) determines an ordering of the meet­
ing times t j , i.e. there is a permutation a = <r(f,g) of {1,2,3,4} such 
that
t<T( 1) < 2 ) <  ^(3) <  t<r{4) =  ( f ,g )  •
In such a case we will say the ( f ,g )  has permutation type <7. If a  and 
/3 are integers and ( /, g) £ P* x P* then the permutation type is unique 
and c^r(j-i-i) ^  T  1 /2 .
There is a complementary notion (introduced in [5]) by which each
permutation a determines a canonical strategy pair (Fa, Ga), such that in
the interval ta(j-i) < t <  ^(j)j 3 =  - • -»4 (with a (0) defined as 0 and to
as 0) the path Fa and the path Za^  (which depends on Ga ) are moving 
towards each other at maximum speed. It is shown in [5, Theorem 3 
and its proof] that the canonical strategy pair ( F ^ ,^ )  minimizes all the 
meeting times t j , within the class of strategy pairs of permutation type 
<j . It follows that the minimax rendezvous time, as well as the leasted 
expected rendezvous time, will be attained for some canonical strategy. 
However there may also be non-canonical strategy pairs which acheive 
the minimax rendezvous time.
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To see how this definition defines a unique strategy pair (Fa, Ga), 
we illustrate the construction for the identity permutation a, using the 
simpler notation /  =  and g = G&. The path /  is pictured in Figure 
3.1 for the parameters a , /? where a < j3. The strategies begin with 
the player I path /  and the player II possible path Z\ (t)  =  a — g (t ) 
moving towards each other at maximum speed. Since Z\ is above /  at 
time zero, this means that / '  =  1 and Z[ =  —1, or g' =  +1, from time 
zero until the first meeting time t\ =  a /2 . At this time Z2 is above /  and 
so / '  =  +1 and Z*2 = — 1, or g' =  — 1, from time t \  — a/2  until /  meets 
Z 2 at time t 2 =  a. Note that /  (a) =  a  and g (a) =  0 .  At time t 2 = a , 
Ziz (a) =  —/3 — g (a) =  —/3 is below /  (a) =  a  and so for the next time 
interval,
t2 < t < £3 =  t2 +  (a  — (—/3)) /2  =  (3a +  /?) /2,
/ '  =  —1 and Z3 =  +1, or g' =  —1. At time £3, /  is at (a  — /3) /2, while 
Z 4  is lower, at — (a  +  3/3) /2. Hence /  goes down and Z 4  goes up (or g 
goes up) throughout the interval
<3 <  t < U = h +  -  ( - ^ ^ ) )  /2  =  2a +  /3.
The data just derived are presented in the first data row of the following 
table which gives the four meeting times for the canonical strate­
gies (Fa,G a) corresponding to various permutations. While this table 
contains just six of the 4!=24 possible permutations, it will in fact be 
sufficient to calculate the minimax rendezvous time (this will be evident 
in the proof of the following theorem).
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&  t< r( 1) t< r(2) t< r(3) t r (4 )  ~  Ta,f3 (Fa, Ga)
(1 ,2 ,3 ,4) a /2 a (3a +  j3) /2 2a + (3
(1 ,2 ,4 ,3) a /2 a (3a +  /?)/2 2a + (3
(1 ,3 ,2 ,4) a /2 (2a + /))/2 (3a +  /?)/2 2a + fS
(1,3,4,2) a /2 (2a + f3)/2 a  + (3 (3a + 3/3)/2
(1,4,2,3) a /2 (« +  /? )/ 2 a  +  /3 (3a + 3(3) /2
(1,4,3,2) a /2 (<* +  /?)/ 2 a  +  /? (3a + 3(3)/2
Table 3.1: Meeting times for canonical strategies (F ^G ^). 
The data in this table will be useful in the following.
Theorem  3.1 The minimax rendezvous time for the problem T (a, /3) , a  <
P,  ^
min T a^ ( f , g )  =  2a + /?.
f,gePxP  w , y y  r
Furthermore, i f  T a,/3 ( /, g) =  2a +  (3 and a  < /?, then the permutation 
type of ( f ,g )  is (1,2,3,4), (1,2,4,3), or (1,3,2,4).
Proof. According to the result of [5] quoted above, the minimax 
rendezvous time is the minimum of T a^  (Fa,G a) as cr varies over the 
permutations of {1,2,3,4} . We claim that it is sufficient to consider only 
the six permutations listed in the table above (those where the player II 
path a —g (t ) is intersected first) , where the minimum (given that a  <  (3) 
is 2a +  /?. The cases which intersect the player II path a  +  g (t) first will 
give the same results, that is the same meeting times ta^ ,  the same F, 
and a sign reversal for G. The cases which intersect either of the paths 
—(3 ±  g (t) first will give a similar table with a  and /? interchanged. So 
the only new maximum rendezvous time appearing in such a table would
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be 2/? +  a , which is not less than 2a -f (3. When a  < (3, only the first 
three data rows of the table give the minimum 2a +  (3. □
As a special case of the above result when a  =  (3 =  1, we have 
the following solution to the standard two person minimax rendezvous 
problem.
Corollary 3.1 M 2 =  3
The three person ‘sticky’ rendezvous problem fa  to be analyzed in 
the next section may reduce to the problem T (1,2) in certain cases. For 
this reason we explicitly give the four optimal player I strategies in P* 
for T (1,2) in the following result.
Corollary 3.2 The minimax rendezvous value for the problem T (l,2 )  
is 4. Furthermore i f T 1,2 ( f ,g )  =  4, for  ( /, #) £ P* x P* then f  is one of 
the four strategies in P* which satisfy
f  (1/2) =  1/2, /  (5/2) =  - 1 /2 ,  and / ( 4 )  =  - 2 ,  i.e.
h  =  [ + i ,+ i ,
h  = [ + i , - i , + i , - i ,
h =  [ + 1 , -1 , - i , + i , - i , - i , - i , - i ] ,
U =  [ + 1, - 1, - 1, - 1, + 1, - 1, - i , - i ] .
Each of these has maximum rendezvous time of 4 when paired with the 
player I I  strategy g =  [+1, —1, —1, —1, —1 ,+ 1 ,+ 1 ,+ 1 ]. (See Figure 3.2.)
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P ro o f. The reader should first verify the obvious fact that the f'k s are 
indeed the only four strategies in P * which satisfy the three conditions 
(including of course / ( 0 )  =  0, which is part of the definition of P*). 
According to Theorem 3.1 we can only find optimal strategies for the 
permutation types (1,2,3,4), (1,2,4,3), and (1,3,2,4).
C ase 1, <7 is (1 ,2 ,3 ,4) or (1 ,2 ,4 ,3): Suppose T 1,2 ( /,# )  =  4 for ( /,  <7) 6 
P* x P*, and
t\ < £2 < 3^? t4.
We may assume that ti =  1/2 and /(1 /2 )  =  (1/2) =  1/2 because in
the alternative case that /  (1/2) =  —1/2 the resulting problem at time 
1/2 is either T (1,2)(if I is told that II moved down) or T (2,1) (if I is told 
that II moved up), and therefore (by Theorem 3.1) requires an additional 
4 units of time to ensure meeting. Since g(t)  — g (  1/2) >  1/2 — t and 
g (1/2) =  1/2 it follows that g (t) > 1/2 — (t — 1/2) =  1 — t, for t >  1/2. 
Hence after /  has intercepted 1 + g(t)  at time t2, we must have that
/  (t) >  2 — t, for t > t2. (3.1)
Since /  intersects 1 +  g at time t2 and — 2 + g at time t4 < 4 , and speeds 
are bounded by 1, we must have
U -  <2 >  |(1 +  g (h))  -  ( - 2  + g (t2))| /2  =  3/2, 
or t2 < t 4 — 3/2 < 5/2.
Suppose that strict inequality holds in (3.1), that /  (5 ) =  2—s+ p  for some 
p > 0 and some time s < 4. Then a player I starting at position 2 +  p at 
time zero, following path 2—t+p  until tim et =  3, and then following path 
/ ,  could ensure meeting paths — 2±# by time 4. But this would mean that 
the minimax rendezvous time for the problem T (0,4 +  p) = T (4 -f p, 0) 
is not more than 4, whereas Theorem 3.1 says it is equal to 4 + p. Hence
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our assumption that f  (t) could be larger than 2 — t was false, and (3.1) 
must hold with equality, that is,
/  (£) =  2 — t, for t >  5/2. (3-3)
We showed earlier that /  6 P* must go through (1/2,1/2) and (3.3) 
shows further that it must go through (5/2, -1/2) and (4, -2). It follows 
that it must be one the four strategies f k • (Actually it cannot be / 4 in 
this case, but we do not need to prove this fact.)
C ase 2, <r is (1 ,3 ,2 ,4): Suppose T 1,2 ( f ,g )  = 4 for (f , g ) € P* x P*, and
t\ < 3^ < £2 < 4^ =  4.
Since speeds are bounded by 1, it follows that
4 — t 2 =  £4 — 2^ >  1^ 4 (^2) — ^2 (^)l /2 =  |—2 +  <7 (f2) — (1 +  g (^2))! =  3/2, 
hence we have 5/2 > i2 >  3^ +  1/2,
i.e., tz <  2.
(3.4)
By the same reasoning as (3.4) , we have
> |^3 (^1) ~  ^1 (^i) | / 2
=  I- 2 —flr(*l) — (1 — f l ( « l ) ) | / 2
(3.5)
=  3/2,
and so t$ > t\ + 3/2 >  2.
The only solution to (3.4) and (3.5) is t\ =  1/2, tz =  2, tf2 =  5/2, £4 =  4,
which are the times for the canonical strategy pair with this permutation.
Hence /  must be Fa = / 4. □
The optimal strategies for the problem T (1,2) are drawn in Figure
3.2. They are also drawn in a stacked form in Figure 3.4, which will be 
discussed later.
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We conclude this section with an analysis of some two person ren­
dezvous problems where one of the players (taken to be I) knows the 
direction of the other. Since this person will clearly move at speed one in 
this direction, these are really one person problems. The only strategic 
variable is the path of player II. These results are called lemmas because 
they will be used in Section 3.5 in the following way: When two play­
ers meet and do not know the direction of the other, they will each be 
assigned a direction and will assume the remaining player lies in that 
direction. A lower bound on the maximum time taken to find the re­
maining player, assuming he is in this direction, is the minimax value of 
the game in which the direction is known. It is these minimax values 
that we now calculate. These are all very simple results.
Lem m a 3.1 Suppose player I  is placed facing up at 0 and player II  is 
either placed facing down at 1 or facing up at 2. Then the minimax ren­
dezvous time is 3/2. Furthermore this maximum meeting time occurs if  
and only if I  moves up at speed one and II uses a strategy h E P sat­
isfying h ( 3/2) =  —1/2. There are three strategies h 6 P*, defined up to 
time 3/2, satisfying this condition. In the notation giving the slopes of 
the paths in successive time intervals of length 1/2 these paths (as shown 
in Figure 3.3) are as follows:
hi = [+1, —1, —1],
hi =  [—1 ,—1,+1], 
hz =  [—1,+1, —1].
P ro o f. If player II uses strategy /i, the maximum meeting time T  (h ) 
is the time required for the path t (of player I) to meet both possible 
paths of II, that is 1 — h (t ) and 2 h ( t ) . This is the same as the time 
required for h £ P  to meet both 1 — t and t — 2 (See Figure 3.3). Clearly
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if h (3/2) =  —1/2 then it meets both these paths at time 3/2. If it meets 
either of these paths before this time, the earliest it can meet the other is 
3/ 2, since these two paths are approaching each other at combined speed
2. Furthermore if h ( 3/2) > —1/2 then it cannot yet have intersected 
t — 2; if h (3/2) < —1/2 then it cannot yet have intersected 1 — t. Thus 
only paths with h ( 3/2) =  —1/2 can acheive a maximum meeting time 
of 3/2. The three paths stated in the lemma are the only ones in P* 
satisfying this condition. These paths are illustrated in thick lines in 
Figure 3.3.0
The following two lemmas are even easier, as they give minimax times 
when player I knows not only the direction but also the initial distance 
to player II. They may appear too obvious to bother stating, but we do 
so because they will be used repeatedly in Section 3.5, without specific 
mention. (The first is actually a corollary of Theorem 3.1, with a  =  0).
Lem m a 3.2 I f  player I  is placed (at time 0/ facing up at position 0 and 
player I I  is placed in a random direction at position (3 > 0, at any time 
prior to time (3, then the minimax rendezvous time is (3. Call this problem 
V  (/?).
Lem m a 3.3 I f  player I  is placed (at time 0/ facing up at position 0 and 
player I I  is placed in a known direction (say up) at position (3 > 0, at 
time S, —(3 < 5 <  (3, then the minimax rendezvous time is (/3 -f J) /2. 
Call this problem T/; (/?, S ) .
3 .4  S tick y  T h ree  P erson  R en d ezvou s
We are now in a position to attack the problem I 3. Recall that in this 
problem three players are randomly placed onto the integers 0, 1, and
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2, and faced in random directions. Once two players meet, they must 
stick together while trying to locate the third. The players’ strategy 
paths are assumed to belong to P*. The main result of this section is the 
determination of the minimax rendezvous time M3 for this problem.
T h e o rem  3.2 The minimax rendezvous time M 3  for the sticky three per­
son problem 1?3 is 5.
P roo f. We first show that M3 < 5 by exhibiting a simple strategy 
triple which guarantees three player rendezvous by time five. The sim­
plest version is that two of the players remain still (until they are met 
by the moving player) while the third moves forward, taking along any 
player he meets, until he reaches an integer location with no player on it. 
He then reverses direction, similarly taking along any player he meets, 
until he has accumulated both of the other players. The case with max­
imum rendezvous time is when the moving player starts in the middle, 
and in this case the rendezvous time is 5. Since the strategy of staying 
still in Stage 1 does not belong to P*, it has to be modified. The modi­
fication is simply to oscillate between the starting point and a point 1/2 
unit forward. The analysis for the modified strategy is essentially the 
same and it also has a maximum rendezvous time of 5.
To demonstrate that M3 >  5 , we assume that there is a strategy 
triple S* with T  (S*) = 9/2, and then show that this assumption leads to 
a contradiction. Since for strategies involving paths in P* intersections 
can occur only at integer multiples of 1/ 2, this will establish that M3 >  5.
Let S  = (^1, 52, 53) be the Stage 1 strategies for S*. We may assume 
that each is simply the identity function t for t <  1/ 2. Observe that 
for any of the three players j  =  1,2,3, there is an initial configuration 
c =  c{j )  for which the two players other than j  meet at time 1/2 . (For
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example c (2) =  (0,2,1, +1, +1, - 1 ) . )  Let Xj denote the strategy (path) 
followed by the two who meet in case c( j )  from time 1/2 onwards. We 
normalize this so that the position of these two players at time £ +  1/2 is 
Xj M  plus their position when they meet at time 1/2. Thus Xj belongs to 
P* (takes value 0 at 0 ). Similarly let Sj denote the remainder of player 
j ’s path from time 1/2 onwards, Sj (t) =  Sj (t  +  1/2) — Sj (1 /2). Thus Sj 
also belongs to P * (takes value 0 at 0). Note that the situations of player 
j  and of the remaining two players are the same as that of players I and 
II in the game T (1,2); the paired players are either 1 unit above player 
j  (that is in the direction he was initially pointed) or 2 units below him. 
Hence it follows that
Tc(j) (S*) =  1/2 +  T 1’2 ( 5 j , x j ) ,
where T 1’2 is the minimax rendezvous time defined in the previous sec­
tion for the game T ( l ,2 ) .  Our assumption that T  (S*) = 9/2 implies 
that Tc(j) (S *) <  9/2 and by the above that T 1,2 (sj ,Xj)  <  4. It follows 
from Corollary 3.2 that T 1,2 (sj ,Xj) = 4 and that Sj belongs to the set of 
optimal strategies for player I in T (1 ,2), that is, to the set { / i , /2, / 3, f*}
Since the above argument holds for each player j  =  1,2,3, we have 
shown that the Stage 1 paths of S* must be optimal for the problem 
T (1,2) from time 1/2 onwards, that is
Sj e  { / i , /2, / 3, / 4}, fo r j  =  1,2,3.
It now follows that there is a case c for which none of the three players 
meet (not even two of them) by time 9/2, that is Tg(5*) > 9/2, which 
contradicts our assumption. To see that such a case (initial configura­
tion) c exists, first look at Figure 3.4. This shows a drawing of the four 
paths / i , / 2? /3?/4 with each preceeded by a slope 1 diagonal for time
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1/2. The lower indexed functions are started at higher positions on the 
line, and there are no intersections by time 9/2. The general algorithm 
for choosing c as a function of (5i , 52, s 3) is verY simple: Point all the 
players up, and place the players using lower indexed fk s higher. If two 
players are using the same fk then of course it doesn’t m atter which 
of these is placed higher. For example, if (51, 32, 63) =  , then
c =  (2,0,1, + 1, + 1, + 1) • E
3.5  T h ree  P layer  R en d ezvou s (U n restr ic ted )
In this section we show that three players placed on adjacent integers 
can ensure a three way meeting by time 4, that is M3 =  4. This is a 
savings of one time unit over the 5 needed in the sticky case considered 
in the previous section. The novel feature considered here is that players 
who meet can separate to find the third (although the game does not end 
until all three are together).
Lem m a 3.4 M3 < 4.
P ro o f. We exhibit a strategy profile with a maximum rendezvous time 
of 4. The Stage 1 strategies are the same as for the optimal sticky ren­
dezvous: Player 1 follows the path (given in slope form for half unit time 
interval) [+1,+1, —1, —1, —1, —1] up to time 3. The other two players 
follow a path which oscillates between their start and a point half a unit 
away, such as [+1, — 1, +1, — 1, -fl, — 1, +1, — 1]. If player 1 has not met 
another player by time 1, then he can conclude the other players were 
both behind him, so when he reverse direction at time 1 he continues 
forever in this direction, bringing with him the first player he meets (at 
time 3), and meeting the second at time 4. If he first meets another
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player at time 1, the two who meet know that the remaining player is 
either 1 above or 2 below, and will be there at every integer time. So one 
of them (say player 1) goes 1 above and then reverses, while the other 
goes 2 below and then reverses. If either finds the remaining player he 
asks that player to stick with him. Thus the two who originally met 
will meet again in not more than three time units, at player l ’s starting 
point. Furthermore one of the two is sure to have brought the remaining 
player along with him. Finally, if player 1 first meets a player at time 
1/ 2, he can ignore this and bring that player back to that player’s start. 
This puts the two who met in the situation analyzed above. Thus in any 
case the rendezvous time is not more than 4. □
Lem m a 3.5 M3 > 7/2. Furthermore any strategy profile for the game 
r 3 which has a maximum rendezvous time of 7/2 must have all its stage 
1 paths, up to time 2, belonging to the set { ^ i , ^ 2 ,^3 }  defined as follows. 
The path hk is the path hk of Lemma 3.1, preceeded by a forward speed 
one motion for t < 1/2. That is, hk(t)  =  t, t <  1/2, and hk (2) =  
hk (t — 1/2) +  1/2, t > 1/2. In the notation giving the slope in each half 
unit of time, these paths are
h i  =  [+ 1  +  1 , —1 , —1] ,
^ 2  =  [ + 1 ,  —1, —1 , + 1 ] ,  
hz =  [+ 1, — 1, + 1, — 1] •
P ro o f. As in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we begin by assuming an initial 
configuration such that the two players other than player j  meet each 
other at time 1/2. One of these players (call each of these player I), must 
go up to find the remaining player j  (call him player II). Renormalize the 
line so that the origin (0) is where the two players have met. Assuming II
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is above this, he is either at 1 facing down (if he started facing down) or 
at 2 facing up (if he started facing up). Hence by Lemma 3.1 the earliest 
that the player I who goes up can guarantee finding II, assuming he is 
up, is (additional) time 3/2. It follows that the earliest the two agents of 
Player I (the one going up and the one going down) can meet together, 
bringing along player II, is T  =  1/2 +  2(3/2) =  7/2. Furthermore, it 
follows from the second part of Lemma 3.1 that in order for this time to 
be acheived, player II must be following one of the paths hk from time 
1/2. Since we are assuming that strategies for r 3 begin by going up for 
time 1/2, it follows that the player we are calling II and j  must use a 
strategy hk up to time 2. But since this argument applies to any player 
j  = 1,2,3, we are done. □
Lem m a 3.6 Any strategy for the game T3, whose Stage 1 paths (up to 
time 2) belong to the set { h i,^25^3} , has maximum rendezvous time at 
least M  =  4.
Proof. Since order does not m atter, there are ten strategy triples in 
{hi, h2, h3|  . We divide these into four types. For each type we stop the 
action at some time Tq and assume a certain set of initial configurations. 
We then give a lower bound on the maximum remaining time, which 
when added to Tq is at least 4.
T ype 1: A ll three use sam e strategy. This type covers the three 
strategy profiles {hk, hk, hk) > k = 1,2,3. For strategy profiles of this type 
the first integer q such that some players have a different Stage 1 strategy 
for the time interval [q/2, (q +  1) / 2] satisfies q > 4 .
Assume that all three players start facing up. Then at time To =  
q /2 they are back at their original positions, and the top and bottom
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players are at distance 2. By the definition of q, there are two players who 
move in opposite directions in the interval [q/2, (q +  1) /2]. So for some 
initial configuration the player starting at 2 will move up throughout 
this interval and the player starting at 0 will move down. Hence at 
time (q +  1) /2  the players at the ends will be at distance 3. Therefore 
the earliest these two player can meet is at time (q +  1) /2 +  3/2 > 
(4 +  l ) / 2  +  3/2 =  4.
Type 2: T he strategy ( h i , h 2, h 2  ^ is used. Consider two initial con­
figurations case d  =  (2,1 ,0, +1, +1, +1) and case c" =  (2,1 ,0, +1, —1, —1) 
In each of these configurations player 1, who we now call player I, starts 
at 2 and is back at 2 at time To = 2. Player 3, who we now call player 
II, starts at 0 and is back at 0 at time 2. In both cases no players have 
met, so they cannot determine by time 2 which of these cases (c' or c") 
is the actual initial configuration. In case c', player II is pointing up at 
time To, while in case cn he is pointing down. Hence by Lemma 3.2 with 
/3 = 2, players cannot meet before time T0 + (3 = 2 + 2 = 4. This situation 
is illustrated in Figures 3.5(i) and 3.5(ii).
For the remaining types 3 and 4, the analysis will be as follows. For 
each of the two types we give a set of initial configurations. Then for each 
strategy profile of that type, we give a time To at which two players meet 
(who we then call player I) but cannot distinguish between the configu­
rations in the given set. The problem of finding player II above them is 
called r up and the minimax time to find him (or turn back) is denoted by 
Tup ,which can be calculated using Lemmas 3.2 or 3.3 depending on the 
nature of Tup. If the remaining player (II) is below then the associated 
problem and minimax time are denoted by Tdown and Tdown- Thus the 
maximum meeting time T satisfies
T  > T q +■ Tup -f Tdown•
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Examples of types 3 and 4 are illustrated in Figures 3.5(iv) and 3.5(iii) 
respectively. The paths of the two players who meet at time To are drawn 
in bold up to time To; the three possible paths of the remaining player 
(each corresponding to some initial configuation in the given set) is drawn 
in dashed up to time 2 =  To +  8} the parameters (3 and 5 of the games 
T' and T" of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 are drawn from player I’s position at 
time To in thin lines.
Type 3: The strategies (Ji2, h2, h$j or (h2,hz,hz)  are used. Con­
sider the set of configurations
Cz =  { ( 0, 2, 1, + 1, + 1, + 1) ,  (2 , 0 , 1, + 1, —1, —1) ,  (2 , 1, 0, + 1, + 1, + 1)} •
For these two strategy profiles and any of these configurations, a player 
using h2 placed above a player using h,3  will meet at time To =  3/2, 
and they will then be unable to distinguish between these three initial 
configurations. Call this pair player I. For either profile we can take 
r up to be T" (3/2,1/2) and so Tup =  1 by Lemma 3.3. Similarly for 
either profile Tdown =  r'(3/2) so Td0Wn =  3/2. Thus by (3.6) we have 
T >  3/2 H- 1 H- 3/2 =  4. To aid the reader we give the full analysis for 
the profile (h2,h 2,h 3 j , which is illustrated in Figure 3.5(iv). At time 
To we normalize the time back to zero and let the meeting point be the 
new origin. W ith respect to this framework, the position of player II if 
above is 3/2 units above player I (i.e., the two players who met) at time 
1/2. (at actual time 2) and facing up. Hence as claimed above, r up =  
T" (3 /2 ,1/2) . If player II is below player I, then he is 3/2 units below 
in additional time 1/2, and can be facing either way, depending on the 
configuration. Hence as claimed, Tdown = T' (3/2).
T ype 4: One o f the strategies (hi,  hi, h^j , (h \ ,h \h z )  , ( ^ ,^ 3 ,^ 3 ) , 
(h i ,h 2, ^3 ) is used. For these strategy profiles, consider the following
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set of configurations,
C4 =  { (0 ,2 ,1 ,+ 1 ,+ 1 ,+ 1 ) ,(1 ,0 ,2 ,+ 1 ,+ 1 ,4 4 ) ,(1 ,0 ,2 ,+ 1 ,-1 ,+ 1 )}
In each of these profiles, two players meet at time To =  1, Tup =  T" (1,1) 
so Tup =  1 by Lemma 3.3, and Tdown =  T' (2) ,  so Tdown =  2 by Lemma
3.2. Hence in all these cases, T > l  +  l +  2 =  4. □
T h eo rem  3.3 M3 =  4. That is, the minimax rendezvous time for three 
players placed in random directions on consecutive integers is 4.
P roo f. Lemma 3.4 says that M3 <  4, so we need only show that 
M3 >  4. Since we are assuming that all paths belong to P*, it is sufficient 
to show that M3 > 7/2. Lemma 3.5 says that any strategy with maximum 
rendezvous time < 7 / 2  must have all of its Stage 1 paths belonging to 
the set {hi, h2, h3| . However Lemma 3.6 says that any strategy triple 
with this property must have maximum rendezvous time of at least 4. □
3.6  A sy m p to tic  value o f  M n
In this section we estimate the value of the minimax rendezvous time 
Mn for the n-player rendezvous game Tn when n is large. Clearly a 
lower bound for Mn is (n — 1) /2, since the distance between the players 
initially placed at 0 and (n — 1) is (n — 1). The main work of this section 
is the presentation and analysis of a class of strategy profiles S  (n, m) 
for the games Tn which have maximum rendezvous times asymptotic to 
n/2. This analysis thus gives the main result of this section (Theorem 
3.4), that Mn is asymptotic to n / 2.
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We now define the strategy profile S  (n, m) for the games Tn . Up to 
time 3m +  1 the players adopt adjacency search paths called gk • (The 
paths <7i,<72,<73 are drawn in Figure 3.6, for players initially pointed to the 
right.) These paths remain at a player’s starting point except during 
the time interval [3 (k — 1), 3k +  1] of length four, when they search first 
forward one unit, then backwards two units, and then forward again to 
return to the starting point. This path will meet any adjacent player 
who is stationary at their starting point during this period (in particular 
at times 3 (k — 1) +  1 and 3(k — 1) +  3.) More formally these adjacency 
search paths are defined as
9k (<) =  <
* — 3 (Jfc — 1) if t e  [3(fc — 1) ,3(*  —1) +  1],
—t +  (3k — 1) if t € [3 (k — 1) +  1,3k] ,
t — (3k +  1) if t € [3k, 3k +  1],
0 otherwise.
Observe that if k < k' and two adjacent players are using adjacency 
search paths and gw, then they will meet at time 3(k — 1) +  1 or 
3(k — 1) +  3, and in any case by time 3(k — 1) +  3.
In the strategy profile S  (n, m) the players use the first m  adjacency 
search paths <71, . . .  in as equal numbers as possible. We will take as 
an example S  (8 ,3), which is illustrated in Figure 3.6. Due to constraint 
of space, we use the vertical axis to represent time and the horizontal axis 
to represent the players’ positions on the line. Let n = a m + 6, 0 <  b < m, 
and let exactly a +  1 players use each strategy gk, k = 1, . . . ,  b and let 
exactly a players use each adjacency search path k = 6 + 1, • • •, m, for 
times 0 <  t <  3m +  1, disregarding (for the time being) any players they 
may meet. Note that a = I n t ( n / m ) . (In the example, a = 2 and three 
players use <71, three use <72, and two use <73.) Observe that at time 3m + 1 
(10, in the example) all the players are back at their starting points and
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that any pair of adjacent players who are using distinct strategies gk will 
have already met each other, regardless of the directions in which they 
are initially pointed. Once the players have been placed on the integers 
0 , . . . ,  n — 1, name them according to the integer where they start. We 
use a horizontal description of the line on which the players are placed. 
Let L denote the leftmost player for which the adjacent player on the 
right is using a different initial strategy g^. Let R  denote the rightmost 
player such that the player on his left is using a different strategy. (In 
the example L = 2 and R  =  5.) Since there are at most a players to the 
left of L (who are using the same strategy gk as player L) and similarly 
at most a players to the right of player R , we have
L < a, and R > n — a — 1. (3-7)
Note that equality holds in the above if and only if the first a +  1 players 
are all using the same strategy and the last a +  1 players are all using 
the same strategy. If these end groups are initially pointed in a common 
direction, the respective players at L and R would have only met one 
player by time 3m + 1. This configuration (shown in Figure 3.6) produces 
the maximum meeting time T.
We now describe the strategies the players adopt from time 3 m + 1. At 
this time the players have either met no adjacent players, two adjacent 
players, or exactly one adjacent player. (In the example of Figure 3.6, 
players 0,1,6, and 7 are of the first type, nobody is of the second type, 
and players 2,3,4 and 5 are of the third type.) Players of the first two 
types should remain still at their starting points until they meet a player 
who says ‘follow me’. Players of the third type, who have met an adjacent 
player in only one direction, should go in the opposite direction (at speed 
one) until they either, (A) meet another moving player or, (B) reach an 
unoccupied integer location (relative to their starting point). In case
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(A) they stop and remain still until someone says ‘follow me’. In case
(B) they can conclude that they are then at position — 1 or n and hence 
they reverse direction and go at speed one, telling anyone they meet to 
follow them, until the game ends. (In the example of Figure 3.6, players 
L=2 and R=5 reach situation B at time 13, while players 3 and 4 reach 
situation A at time 21 /2.) In general, it follows from the inequalities (3.7) 
that players L and R  reach positions —1 and n respectively (situation B) 
by time (3m +  l) +  (a +  l ) .  They then meet each other, together with 
everyone else, by maximum T  where
T  = Tn < (3m +  1) +  (a +  1) +  (n +  1) /2. (3-8)
(In the example of Figure 3.6, this gives a worst case of 35/2)
Suppose we define m  =Int(log n) so that a = In t(n /In t (log n ) ) . It 
follows that
Tn 3 Int (log n) +  2 +  Int (n /In t (log n)) +  1/2 1 __  1
n ~  n 2 n-*-oo 2
Consequently the minimax rendezvous time Mn satisfies
1 (n  — 1) / 2  M n ^  Tn 1 M„ 1-  =  hm -------  —  < lim  <  lim —  =  - ,  or lim ---- =2 n-foo 72 n-¥oo n n-¥oo 72 2 n-¥oo n 2
Thus we have proved our final result.
T h e o rem  3.4 The minimax rendezvous time Mn, required for n players 
placed on adjacent integers to meet together at a single point, is asymp­
totic to n / 2.
78
K>|
fi
position
3a
a + g
a - g
time
3a+p
a-p
-a -3 p
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79
position
time
-2 +
Figure 3.2: Optimal strategies for the problem r (l,2 )
80
a position
1
0
-2
Figure 3.3: Optimal paths derived in Lemma 3.1
—> 
time
81
7/2 9/2 time3/2 5/21/2
Figure 3.4: A non-intersecting stacking of the strategies fk? 
starting at time 1/2
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C h a p t e r  4
A  R  e  n  d  e z v  o u  s - E  v a  s i o  n  G a m e  
O n  D i s c r e t e  L o c a t i o n s  W  i t h  
J o i n t  R a n d o m i z a t i o n
4.1 In tro d u ctio n
In this chapter we solve a discrete version of the rendezvous-evasion game 
proposed by S. Alpern (in his paper with Beck [4]) for general search 
spaces. This type of game is a two-person zero-sum game between a team 
R  which comprised of two agents R\ and and another player called 
S. All three of them are randomly placed in a known search region where 
they cannot see the others until they come within a specified ‘meeting’ 
or ‘capture’ distance, at which time the game ends. The team R  is 
a pair of ‘rendezvouses’ whose objective is to meet each other before 
either of them is captured by the opposing searcher S. That is, R  wins 
the game if the agents successfully rendezvous while evading the enemy 
searcher. Otherwise, S  wins. The payoff of this game is taken to be 1 if 
S  (maximizer) wins and 0 if R  (minimizer) wins, so that the value of the
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game is simply the probability that S  wins under optimal play.
The rendezvous-evasion game was proposed as a link between two 
related but separate branches of search theory: (i) search games with 
mobile hiders, and (ii) rendezvous search. The first of these, as proposed 
by R. Isaacs [13], studies the zero-sum game played between a mobile 
searcher (minimizer) and a mobile hider (maximizer) in a given region 
with capture time as the payoff. Extensive work has been done on these 
games in the last few decades ([2], [3], [10], [11], [13], [21]). The more re­
cent problem of rendezvous search asks how two players randomly placed 
in a known region can meet in the least expected time. There are two 
versions, namely the asymmetric version where the two players can agree 
on distinct strategies and the symmetric version where the players cannot 
distinguish themselves and must therefore use the same mixed strategy 
[1]. Both versions have received attention recently ([1], [4], [5], [7], [8], 
[17]), particularly for the case where the search region is the line. In 
the rendezvous-evasion game with joint randomization the agents are in­
volved in an asymmetric rendezvous problem with each other, while at 
the same time playing the role of the hider in a search game with mobile 
hider against the searcher S. However, unlike the continuous payoff (i.e., 
capture or meeting time) games it is based on, the rendezvous-evasion 
game is one of kind, in that the outcome depends on which of the two 
times (rendezvous or capture) occurs earlier. In [6], the symmetric ana­
logue of the rendezvous-evasion game where the rendezvous agents have 
to use the same mixed strategy is considered. At present, we are aware of 
no rendezvous-evasion games which have been solved, although the case 
of a circle as the search region has been considered by S. Alpern and S. 
Gal.
As a preliminary study of the rendezvous-evasion game, we consider
8 6
the case where the search region is comprised of n identical locations and 
the players can move between any two locations in one time step (this 
includes the possibility of staying still). This is the setting of the first 
solution of a pure rendezvous problem by Anderson and Weber [8] who 
analyzed the symmetric version of the problem. We consider a scenario 
which describes both problems: In some room in New York, there are n 
telephones randomly strewn about. These are pairwise connected to n 
telephones in a room in San Francisco. The rendezvous problem studied 
by Anderson and Weber [8] may be illustrated as follows. In each time 
period, the New Yorker and the San Franciscan each picks up a phone 
and says hello. They wish to minimize the expected number of time 
periods required for them to pick up paired telephones. Anderson and 
Weber [8] prove that the strategy of randomly picking up the telephones 
is not optimal when n is greater than 2. To demonstrate the present 
problem, consider the situation where the New Yorker and the San Fran­
ciscan are the ‘rendezvouses’ and all these n cables pass through some 
room in Chicago, where S  can listen in on any single cable in each time 
period. If he hears someone says hello on that cable, he wins the game, 
even if all three are on the same line. Since there is no common la­
belling of the phones, the question of how the telephoners can choose 
their phones so that they can convey information to each other without 
being eavesdropped by the listener is of a rendezvous-evasion nature.
An important general question concerning rendezvous-evasion games 
is whether the optimal strategy for pure asymmetric rendezvous is still 
optimal. In other words, can the rendezvous team when playing opti­
mally, ignore the presence of S  by simply following strategies that mini­
mize the expected time for them to meet? We shall show that the answer 
is ‘no’ when n is 3, as the optimal rendezvous strategy takes a maximum
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of 3 steps to ensure a meeting whereas in asymmetric rendezvous, the 
strategy of one remaining stationary while the other searches requires 
only at most 2 steps. The reason that the (latest possible) meeting must 
be delayed a step is that if the rendezvous team ensured that they would 
meet at the second step, a searcher S  who moved at step 1 could also 
conclude where this meeting would have to occur, and would be there 
himself.
Another general question regarding rendezvous-evasion games is whether 
the rendezvous team can coordinate their movements so as to deter S  
from winning more than 2/3 of the time - 2/3 is the probability that 
the first pairwise meeting is between S  and an agent of R, if all such 
meetings were equally likely. (In the discrete model given here, the prob­
ability 2/3 should be further increased because we ascribe a three way 
meeting as a win for S). We find that with joint randomization for the 
rendezvous team, S  wins with probability less than 2/3 in all the ver­
sions considered in this paper. Our model of rendezvous-evasion with 
joint randomization assumes that the two agents R\ and R 2 get together 
before the game begins and perform a randomization experiment which 
determines the pure strategy (describing the actions of both agents) that 
they will employ during the game.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we give a precise 
formulation of the rendezvous-evasion game Tn on n locations and a 
simplified description of the strategies. We denote the value of this game 
by vn. We solve the game for n equals 3, specifying optimal strategies and 
proving that U3 is 47/76 («  0.61842) (decimals are given for comparisons).
As noted above, this game ends after at most three steps under optimal 
play though two would suffice to ensure that the rendezvous players meet. 
We also give a partial analysis for the case n equals 4, and prove that u4
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is at least 31/54 («  0.57407). In Section 4.3, we consider a general class 
of rendezvous-evasion games Tp in which some additional information 
about the search region (containing n identical locations as before) is 
available to all the players; they share a common notion of a directed 
cycle D which contains all the n locations. For example, we can regard 
the locations as docks on a lake, with the players travelling on boats. The 
players can still move between any two locations (not only those adjacent 
on the directed cycle). This information structure is formalized using the 
isometry group consisting of the n rotations of this cycle, as explained in
[1]. It turns out that this game is easier to solve and we show that the 
value dn is given by the general formula dn =  ((1 — 2 /n )n-1 + 1)/2, which 
increases monotonically to (e-2 +  l) /2  («  0.56767 < 2 /3 ) . In particular, 
we have d3 =  5/9 «  0.55556 < u3 and d4 =  9/16 «  0.5625 < v4. Thus 
in these cases the additional information on the search region (given 
by the directed cycle D) is of relatively more benefit to the rendezvous 
team. In the final section, we compare the results obtained here with 
that obtained in [16], where the rendezvous-evasion game is studied as a 
multi-stage game with observed actions.
4.2  T h e R en d ezvou s-E vasion  G am e Tn
In this section, we formalize the rendezvous-evasion zero-sum game Tn 
between R  (with agents f?i, R 2 ) and 5, where the search region is com­
prised of n identical locations. The main objective of this section is to 
prove that the value of the game vn is 47/76 when n is 3. We subsequently 
establish that v4 is at least 31/54.
At the start of the game, Ri, R 2 and S  are placed randomly on n 
locations so that no two of them occupy the same location (our analysis
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applies even if the initial placement allows two players to be at the same 
location). They do not share a common labelling of the n locations and 
they cannot see the others. We assume that all the players adopt the 
following convention when labelling the locations: The location where he 
or she is initially placed is referred to as 1, the next new location where 
he or she moves to is labelled as 2, and the third location which is neither 
1 nor 2 is labelled as location 3 and so on. We use S(i), Ri(i)  and R 2 {i) 
to denote the respective locations which S , R\ and i?2 each labels as i. 
We consider the discrete version of the game where at every time step, 
each player can stay still or move between any two locations and we say 
that two players meet if they are at the same location at the same time. 
A pure strategy for S  is a rule which spells out his motion at every step 
of the game. For example, ‘move to location 2 at step 1 and stay there 
throughout the rest of the game’ is a pure strategy for S  and is denoted 
by (2 ,2 ,...) . A pure strategy for R  is a rule which describes what each 
of its agents does at every step of the game. For example, lRi  stays still 
for (n — 1) steps while R 2 visits all the (n — 1) locations (other than the 
one which he is initially placed) for the first (n — 1) steps’ is a legitimate 
strategy for R  since this strategy ensures that the game ends by (n — 1) 
steps. In general, we use (a?i, 1/1, . . . ,  yk) to denote a fc-step action for 
R , where R\ visits location R\(xi) while R 2 visits location ^ 2(2/*) at step 
i(i <  k). The above strategy is thus represented by (1 ,2 ,1 ,3 , . . . ,  1, n). 
In the usual sense, a mixed strategy of S  (R) is a randomization of some 
pure strategies of S  (R ). We use S n and R,n to denote the set of mixed 
strategies of S  and R  respectively. If R\ meets R 2 before either one of 
them is captured by 5, the payoff is 0 and we say that R  (minimizer) 
wins. Otherwise, S  (maximizer) wins and the payoff is 1. The payoff of 
the game 7rn(cr, p) when S  uses strategy cr and R  uses strategy p is the
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expected probability that S  wins. Strategy a* of S  and strategy p* of R  
is an optimal pair if
7Tn((T*,p) > 7Tn(cr*,p*) > 7Tn((T,p*) G S n, p G 7ln-
The value vn of the game Tn is defined to be
vn =  max min nn(a.p) =  min max 7rn(a,p).
(T^Sn pG.Hn
4.2.1 The Rendezvous-Evasion Game r3
In this subsection, we consider the game T3 and prove that its value 
is 47/76. We shall first describe a strategy p* for R  and prove that it 
ensures a payoff of no more than 47/76.
A n o p tim a l s tra te g y  for R
We begin by giving an outline of the semi-strategy p for R, which de­
scribes the actions of agents R\ and R 2 at steps 1 and 2. 
S em i-S tra teg y  p
• S tep  1 Ri moves to location Ri(2), while R 2 stays at location
* ( i ) ;
•  S tep  2 There are three types of actions, namely
T y p e  1 : Ri visits location f?i(3) while R 2 stays at 
location /^ ( l) ;
T y p e  2 : R\ visits location i?i(l) while R 2 visits loca­
tion # 2(2);
T y p e  3 : Ri stays at location R\(2) while R 2 visits 
location # 2(2);
Team R  plays Type 1 action with probability 7/19; Type 2 action 
with probability 6/19 and Type 3 action with probability 6/19.
The following lemma describes the conclusions that R  can draw at 
the end of step 2 when using semi-strategy p.
L em m a 4.1 I f  R  uses semi-strategy p for the first two steps and the 
game has not ended by step 2, the agents R\ and R 2 can deduce a common 
labelling of the three locations.
Proof:
The proof of this lemma follows immediately from a step by step analysis 
of the semi-strategy p. If the game does not end by step 1, agents R\ 
and R 2 would be able to deduce that # i(3) =  7?2(1)• If Type 1 action is 
taken at step 2, # i(3) and # 2(1) are the locations visited by agents R\ 
and R 2 and the game is sure to end. If Type 2 action is followed at step 
2 and the game does not end, the agents would be able to conclude that 
f2i(l) =  #2(3). Since there are only three locations, together with the 
analysis of step 1, the agents’ labellings of the locations are related in the 
following manner: # i ( l )  =  #2(3), # i(2) =  # 2(2) and #i(3) =  # 2(1)- If 
Type 3 action is adopted at step 2 and the game does not end, it must 
be that # i(2) =  # 2(3). Then agents #1 and #2 share the following 
common labelling of the three locations: # i ( l )  =  # 2(2), # i(2 ) =  # 2(3) 
and # i(3) =  # 2(1)- n
Now we are ready to describe a full strategy p* for team # , which we 
shall later prove to be optimal.
S tra te g y  p* for te a m  R
• Adopt the semi-strategy p for the first two steps. At step 3, co­
coordinate to meet at each of the locations with probability 1/3. 
The actions of the agents at step 3 is justified by Lemma 4.1.
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Next we shall go on to prove that strategy p* of R  guarantees a 
payoff of not more than 47/76 (which we later prove to be v3) against 
all strategies of S. It is worthwhile to note that in order to prove the 
optimality of a strategy in a two-person zero-sum game, it is sufficient to 
compare the strategy against all pure strategies of the opponent. This is 
the traditional approach. Here, we adopt an alternative procedure.
T h e o rem  4.1 For all cr 6 S3, ^(cr, p*) < 47/76.
Proof:
We proceed with the proof by analyzing each step of strategy p*. Use 
C{ to denote the event that the game ends at step i with S  meeting at 
least one of R\ or R 2 (5  wins); m* to denote the event that the game 
ends at step i with R\ meeting R2 without either of them meeting S  (R  
wins); and to denote the event that the game does not end by step i. 
These three events are mutually exclusive and for each z, Prob(cj|fj_i) +  
Prob(mt-|Jj_i) +  Prob(tt-|J,-_i) =  1.
Corresponding to every strategy cr of S , there is some (3 (0 < (3 < 1/ 2) 
such that at step 1, S  moves to location 5(2) with probability 2(3 and 
stays at location 5(1) with probability (1 —2(3). If 5  chooses to stay at 
location 5(1) at step 1, the game is sure to end by step 1 since by the
definition of strategy p*, only agent R\ moves at step 2, while both R 2
and 5  stay still. 5  and R  each wins with a probability of 1/2 (see Figure 
4.1a). If 5  chooses to move to location 5(2) at step 1, 5  wins when 
location 5(2) coincides with R 2( 1), and this occurs with probability 1/2; 
while R  wins with probability 1/4 (See Figure 4.1b). Thus, we have
Prob(Cl) =  (1/2) (1 — 2/?) +  (1/2) (2/3) =  1/2,
Prob(m i) =  (1/2) (1 — 2 0) +  (1/4) (2 /?)
=  1/2 (1 -  (3) > 1/4.
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As a consequence, Prob(^i) is at most 1/4. We observe from the analysis 
of step 1 that the game proceeds into step 2 if and only if R\ and 5  traded 
positions at step 1, i.e., 5(1) =  Ri(2) and 5(2) =  f?i(l). Since there are 
only three locations, it must be that R\(3) =  5(3) =  /^ ( l ) .  Suppose at 
step 2, 5  moves to location S(i) with probability fa (i =  1,2,3) so that 
Ya=i fa =  1- To analyze step 2, we consider what happens when R  uses 
each type of action. If R  uses Type 1 action (see Figure 4.2a), the game 
is sure to end and R  wins if 5  is not at location 5(3). Hence, R  wins with 
probability (1 — fa) while 5  wins with probability fa. If R  uses Type 2 
action at step 2 (see Figure 4.2b), there are two equally likely scenarios 
and 5  can guarantee winning if 5  visits location 5(2) (=  i2i(l)); or 5  
wins with a probability of 1/2 if 5  visits location 5(1). That is, 5  can 
win with a probability of (fa +  (1/2) fa). R  wins if R i( l)  = # 2(2) and 
5  is not at location 5(2) (=  f?i(l)), i.e., R  wins with a probability of 
(1/2)(1 — fa). In this case, the only way that the game does not end is 
when 5  visits location 5(3) (=  Ri(3)) and the agents Ri and R 2 do not 
meet; this occurs with probability (1/2)fa. Similarly, if R  uses Type 3 
action at step 2 (see Figure 4.2c), there are two equally likely scenarios 
and 5  can guarantee winning if 5  visits location 5(1) (=  f?i(2)); or 5  
wins with probability 1/2 if 5  visits location 5(2), which sums to a total 
probability of (fa +  (1/2)fa). R  wins with probability 1/2 if 5  is not at 
location 5(1) (=  77i(2)), i.e., R  wins with a probability of (1/2)(1 — fa). 
The only way that the game does not end at step 2 and proceeds to step 
3 is when 5  visits location 5(3)(=  Ri(S)) and the agents i?i, R 2 do not 
meet. This occurs with probability (1/2) fa. Summing, we have
Prob(c2|^ )  =  7/19 fa  +  6/19 (1/2 fa +  fa) +  
6/19 (1/2 fa  +  fa) 
=  7/19 +  2/19 (fa +  fa ),
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Prob(t2f t )  =  1/2 x 6/19 f t  + 1 /2  x 6/19 f t  
=  6/19(1 - f t  -  f t) .
At step 3, strategy p* ensures that the agents R\ and i?2 can coordinate 
to meet at each location with probability 1/3. As a result, regardless of 
the action taken by S  at step 3, Prob(c3|£2) =  1/3. Hence, for all cr E f t ,
7r3(a,p*) =  Prob(ci) +  Prob(*i)(Prob(c2f t)  +  Prob(£2f t) ( l /3 ) )
<  1/2 +  1/4 (7/19 + 2 /1 9  ( f t  +  f t )  +
6/19 (1 -  f t  -  f t )  1/3) =  47/76. □
Next, we describe strategy a* for the searcher S  and prove that S  can 
secure a payoff of at least 47/76 with this strategy against all strategies 
of R.
Strategy a* for S
• Step 1 S  moves to a new location 5(2);
• Step 2 Randomize over three actions:
A ction 1: Return to location 5(1);
A ction 2: Stay at location 5(2);
A ction 3: Go to location 5(3);
5  chooses these actions according to the probabilities 5/19, 5/19 and 
9/19.
•  Step k (k >  3) 5  visits each of the locations with probability
1/3.
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T h e o rem  4.2 For any strategy p E 7T3(cr*,p) >  47/76.
Proof:
We first note that for all pure strategies of 7*, there are exactly three 
possible actions at step 1, namely, both 7*i and R 2 stay still, only one 
of them stays still, or both of them move to a new location. We proceed 
with the proof by first considering in each case, a possible action of R  at 
step 1 and show that S  can always guarantee an expected payoff of at 
least 47/76. Any strategy of R  that involves randomization in the first 
step has an expected payoff which is a linear combination of the payoffs 
of these three cases. Hence it has to be at least 47/76 as well. The events 
Ci, mt and t{ are as defined in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Case 1: At step 1, Ri stays at location 7*i(l) and R 2 stays at location
By using strategy cr*, S  must meet either Ri or R 2 at step 1.
Case 2: At step 1, 7*i and R 2 move to locations 7*i(2) and # 2(2) respec­
tively.
Since 7*i and R 2 cannot coordinate at their first step to ensure that they 
meet, there are altogether eight possible scenarios (See Figure 4.3) and 
Prob(ci) =  1/2, Prob(mi) =  1/4 and Prob(ti) =  1/4. If the game does 
not end by step 1, it has to be the case that the labellings of the players 
are cyclic permutations of each other, i.e., for each ia =  1,2,3, the three 
locations 5(u),7*i(u) and 7*2(u) are distinct. (See Figure 4.3(iii), (vi)). 
To be more specific, it is equally likely that the labellings are related in 
the following ways:
5(1) =  7*i(2) =  7*2(3); 
5(2) =  7*i(3) =  7*2(1); 
5(3) =  ^ (1 )  =  7*2(2),
5(1) =  7*i(3) =  7*2(2); 
5(2) =  R 1(l) = R2( 3); 
5(3) =  R t ( 2) =  fl2(l).
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Ri has three possible actions at step 2, i.e., to move to locations J?i(l), 
i?i(2), or .Ri(3). This is also true for agent R 2. In other words, there 
are altogether nine possible actions for R  at step 2. The probabilities 
that S  wins are given in the matrix C2 written below, where the ac­
tions of S  moving to locations 5(1), 5(2), and 5 (3) are represented by 
the rows in that order, and the actions of R  are arranged as columns 
in the order (1,1), (1,2), (1,3), (2,1), (2,2), (2,3), (3,1), (3,2), (3,3). For 
example, since the labellings of the players are cyclic permutations of one 
another, if all players visit the location which all of them labels as a;, no 
two players meet. These are the three 0 entries. If S  visits location 5(1) 
and R  uses action (1,2), R 2 meets 5  or R\ with an equal probability of 
1/2; and this is the (1,2) entry in matrix C2.
C2 =
' 0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 ^
1 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1
1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 J
By deleting repeated columns in the matrix C2, we obtain a reduced
version of the matrix C2, which we denote by C where
1 1 / 2  0 1 
 ^1 1/2 1 0 /
Let a, (i = 1 ,2,3,4) denote the probability that R  chooses the action 
represented by column i of the reduced matrix (X^=i on =  1). We have
P r o b ^ l^ )  =  (  5/19  5/19  9/19  )  C ' <*2 
a 3
V a * /
= 14/19 +  1/2 a 2 +  14/19 a 3 +  10/19 a 4
> 1/ 2 .
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The expected payoff in this case is given by
7t3(<7*,p) > Prob(ci) +  Prob(fi) x Prob(c2|<i)
=  1/2 +  1/4 x 1/2 
=  5/8 > 47/76.
Case 3: At step 1, R\ moves to location R\{2) while R2 stays at location
R2( 1).
The case where R 2 visits location R 2(2) while Ri stays at location i? i(l) 
at step 1 can be treated in the same way to obtain the same result. Here, 
there are four equally likely scenarios and Prob(ci) =  1/2, Prob(m i) =  
1/4 and Prob(fi) =  1/4 (See Figure 4.4). Observe that the game pro­
ceeds to step 2 if and only if S  and R\ swapped locations at step 1, i.e., 
5(2) =  -fti(l), 5(1) =  i?i(2) and 5(3) =  i?i(3) =  R 2(l). This scenario 
is illustrated as (iii) in Figure 4.4. We note that it is then equally likely 
that the labellings of i?i, R2 and 5  are related in the following ways:
5(1) =  R x( 2) =  # 2 (2); 
5(2) =  R 1(l)  =  i?2(3); 
5(3) =  R x{ 3) =  5 2(1),
5(1) =  R x( 2) =  R 2(3); 
5(2) =  R 1(l)  =  /fc(2); 
5(3) =  Ri{ 3) =  R 2{ 1).
Ri has three possible actions at step 2, i.e., go to -Ri(l), Ri(2) or Ri(3). 
Since R 2 has stayed at location i?2(l) at step 1, he has only two possible 
actions at step 2, namely, to stay at location # 2(1) or to move to location 
R 2(2). Altogether, there are six possible actions for R  at step 2, that is 
(1,1), (1,2), (2,1), (2,2), (3,1), (3,2). Suppose the kth. action of R  in the 
list above is chosen with probability 7* ( ^ =17fc =  1). The probability 
that 5  wins when 5  visits location S(i) at step 2 and R  uses the &th 
action is given as the (i,fc) component of the matrix C2. In a similar 
manner, the matrix M2 gives the respective probabilities that R  wins at
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step 2. For example, if 5  visits location 5(1) while R  uses action (1,1), 
all three players occupy different locations and so the (1,1) entry of both 
C2 and M 2 is 0. If S  visits location 5(1) while R  chooses action (1,2), 
i ?2 meets either R\ or 5  with an equal probability of 1/2. Thus the (1,2) 
component of C2 and M 2 are both 1/2.
f 0 1 /2 1 1 0 1 /2  ^ ( 0 1 /2 0 0 1 0 ^
IICN 1 1 0 1 /2 0 1 /2 II 0 0 0 1 /2 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 J 1/2 0 1/2 0 ° >
Hence we have
Prob(c2|*i) =  (  5/19 5/19 9/19 )  C2
71
72
73
74
75 
\  76 )
=  14/19 71 +  15/38 72 +  14/19 73 + 15/3874 + 
9/19 75 +  14/19 76,
' 7 1 '
72
73
74
75
Prob(m 2|*i) =  (  5/19 5/19 9/19 ) M>
V 7e /
=  7/19 72 +  7/19 74 +  10/19 75.
Since 5  visits each of the location at step 3 with an equal probability of 
1/3, it has to be true that Prob(c3^2) > 1 /3 . The expected payoff in this 
case is at least
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Prob(ci) +  Prob(^i)(Prob(c2|ti) +  Prob(£2|t i)( l/3 ))
=  Prob(ci) +  Prob(^i)(Prob(c2^i) +  (1 — Prob(c2|^i) — Prob(m 2|ti))( l/3 ))
=  7/12 +  1/(57)(77i +  2^2 +  773 +  274 +  275 +  776)
> 7/12 +  2/57 =  47/76.
If R  randomizes over these three cases at step 1, the expected payoff is a 
linear combination of the payoffs of the above cases, so it is still true that 
the expected payoff is at least 47/76. Hence, for all strategies p £ 7^ -3, 
tt3(<rm,p) >  47/76. □
By combining Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, we obtain the following.
T h e o rem  4.3 The value V3  is 47/76.
At this point, we make a comparsion between the optimal strategy 
p* of Ri, R 2 in this rendezvous-evasion context with that in the absence 
of S. It has been mentioned in [8] that when the rendezvous players are 
allowed to use different pure strategies to minimize the expected meeting 
time, it is optimal for one of them to stay still while the other searches 
all other locations in some random order. If R  restricts to this strategy 
(which is described by Type 1 action at step 2 of strategy p*), it can 
ensure a successful rendezvous by two steps. Nevertheless, a searcher 
who has moved to a new location at step 1 would also be able to deduce 
exactly where the agents will meet at step 2 (in the same way that the 
moving rendezvous agent can) and S  would be there himself to win the 
game. This explains the need for R  to possibly delay their meeting by 
one more step so that there is no way that S  can have a sure win at step 
2, and thus the use of mixed strategies by both R  and S. It is crucial to 
observe that the presence of S  in the rendezvous-evasion context cannot 
be ignored by R  under optimal play here.
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The reader might now be wondering how the optimal strategy pair 
(cr*,p*) was derived. (<r*,p*) was initially obtained by the author while 
considering a different game, in which players have to announce their ac­
tions at the end of each step [16]. However, it turns out that such truthful 
announcement does not change the value of the game. We provide an 
explanation for this. If we examine the strategy pair (cr*,p*), we find 
that step 1 is a pure action for both S  and R , so that the announcement 
of actions at the end of step 1 is not critical. At step 2, if the game does 
not end, we see from Lemma 4.1 that R  would be able to coordinate in 
the following step to ensure a successful rendezvous; this is regardless of 
what S  has done at step 2 so that knowing the action of S  at step 2 
does not help R  at all. Such coordination on the part of R  also means 
that whatever extra information that S  can deduce from knowing the 
action of R  at step 2 really does not give S  any extra edge in the game 
at step 3; the best that S  can do is to pick each of the three locations 
equiprobably. To summarize, the obligatory announcement of actions at 
the end of each step by R  does not prevent the team from securing the 
payoff of 47/76, neither does announcement on the part of S  deter the 
searcher himself from sustaining the same payoff.
4.2.2 The Rendezvous-Evasion Game r4
In this subsection, we consider the game T4 where the search region 
comprises of four identical locations. We propose a strategy for S  which 
secures a payoff of 31/54 against all strategies of R. We include this 
result here solely for comparison purposes later on and the lower bound 
of 31/54 for the value v4 suffices.
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Strategy a of 5
Consider the following strategy cr of 5:
• S tep  1 Move to a new location 5(2);
• S tep  2 Move to a third location 5(3);
•  S tep  k ( k >  3) Visit each of the four locations with probability 
1/4.
L em m a 4.2 For all p E R ,4, n^o-yp) >  31/54.
Proof:
Since 5  adopts a random choice of locations from step 3 onwards, 5  wins 
with a probability of at least 1/4 given that the game continues into step 
3. We shall see that in order to obtain the lower bound of 31/54, it is 
sufficient to compare strategy <7 against all two-step actions of 72. We note 
that when 5  uses strategy <7 and both 72i and R 2 stay still at step 1, the 
probability that 5  captures one of the agents at step 1 is 2 /3(>  31/54). 
Hence, we may restrict our analysis to two-step actions of R  where at least 
one of the agents moves to a new location at step 1. We use ct to denote 
the event that 5  wins at step i and t{ to denote the event that the game 
does not end by step i. For all such two-step actions of 72, we compute 
the expression Prob(ci)+ Prob(c2) +  l/4Prob(72) as a lower bound for 
the payoff. By symmetry of 72i and # 2, there are twelve such actions 
for 72. We summarize the lower bounds for the payoffs corresponding to 
all such actions, (a?i,yi,£2, 2/2) in Table 4.1. For example, when 72 uses 
action (1,2,1,1), we can see from Figure 4.5 that Prob(ci) =  4/9. In 
the three cases ((i), (vii), (viii)) where the game proceeds to step 2, we 
note that other than in (i) where 5  wins with probability 1 at step 2, 5  
can only manage a winning probability of 1/2, and the game continues
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with another probability of 1/2 into step 3. Thus Prob(c2) =  2 /9(=  
1/9 +  1/2 x 2/9), Prob(t2) =  1 /9(1 /2 x 2/9) and the lower bound of 
25/36(= 4/9 +  2/9 +  1/4 x 1/9) is obtained.
Prob(ci) Prob(c2) Prob(<2)
Lower Bound of Payoff 
(=Prob(ci)+  Prob(c2)+  
1/4 Prob(f2))
(1, 2 , 1, 1) 4/9 2/9 1/9 25/36 (ss 0.69444)
(1, 2 , 1, 2) 4/9 2/9 1/9 25/36 (ss 0.69444)
(1 ,2,1,3) 4/9 7/36 1/18 47/72 (ss 0.65278)
(1, 2 , 2 , 1) 4/9 5/54 4/27 31/54 (ss 0.57407)
(1, 2 , 2 , 2) 4/9 5/54 4/27 31/54 («  0.57407)
(1, 2 , 2 ,3) 4/9 17/108 7/54 137/216 («  0.63426)
(2 , 2 , 1, 1) 11/27 7/27 4/27 19/27 (ss 0.70370)
(2 , 2 , 1, 2) 11/27 5/27 4/27 17/27 (ss 0.62963)
(2,2,1,3) 11/27 19/108 7/54 133/216 (S3 0.61574)
(2, 2, 2 ,2) 11/27 7/27 4/27 19/27 (sb 0.70370)
(2, 2 ,2 ,3) 11/27 19/108 7/54 133/216 (ss 0.61574)
(2, 2 ,3,3) 11/27 5/36 11/54 129/216 (ss 0.59722)
Table 4.1: Lower Bounds of the Payolf ^ ( d ,  (£ i,y i, £2*2/2))
From Table 4.1, we see that all payoffs are bounded below by 31/54. 
Hence, we must have 7r4(<j, p) >  31/54 for all strategies p of fL □
4.3  T h e R en d ezvou s-E vasion  G am e
In this section we analyze a different version of the rendezvous-evasion 
game T J, where all players share a common notion of a directed cycle 
D which contains all the n locations. This information structure can be
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formalized using the isometry group of the complete graph which consists 
of all the n rotations of this cycle [1]. Here, we adopt all the terminologies 
defined for the game Tn in Section 4.2 except for the labellings of the 
locations. We assume that the location which the player is initially placed 
is labelled as 1 and the remaining locations are labelled in an increasing 
order along the given direction of the cycle D. We use 7rJ( v )  and dn to 
denote the payoff and the value of the game. We shall first describe a 
strategy pair ((7*,p*) for S  and R  before we prove that it is an optimal 
strategy pair for the game TJ, and establish the result dn =  ((1— 2/n )n -1-f- 
l ) / 2 .
S tra te g y  cr* fo r S
• At each step, S  visits each of the n locations with probability 1/n , 
independent of previous choices.
Essentially, <r* is the random strategy. However, we shall see that R\ 
and f?2 can do better than using their version of the random strategy. 
We provide the intuition for strategy p* which is described below. The 
main idea is that in the absence of 5, we would expect that in order to 
minimize the expected meeting time, R  cannot do better than adopt the 
‘one-stays-still-the-other-searches’ strategy. Strategy p* is fundamentally 
equivalent to this, although there is an additional randomization element, 
the purpose of which is to introduce noise into the search process to 
confuse the searcher.
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Strategy p* for R
• Before the start of the game, R\ and R2 together choose at random 
an element ( ti, t2, • • •, Tn_i) from the set {1, 2, • • •, n}71-1.
• At each step k (k = 1 , . . . ,  n — 1), Ri visits location R i fa )  while 
R 2 visits location R 2(Xk)), where Ak is congruent (mod n) to k + Tk.
In essence, strategy p* is a randomization of nn_1 pure strategies. 
For example, when n is 3 and the random element chosen is (1,2), the 
strategy adopted by R  would be (1,2,2,1).
Before we proceed to prove the optimality of the strategy pair (cr*, p*n), 
we evaluate the payoff (cr*, p*). Due to the construction of strategy 
p*, the game has to end by step (rc — 1) and the rendezvous team is 
equally likely to meet at any one step so that the payoff is given by
n—1
nn (KiP*n) =  1 “  Pl0b (R willS at SteP k)
k=1
n-i i i n
= ((i -  + \)i2. (4.i)
Now, we shall prove that strategy p* of R  ensures that the payoff is no 
more than 7r^(cr^,Pn)(= ((1 — 2/ n )n_1 +  1)/ 2) for all strategies of S.
T h e o rem  4.4 For all a £ <Sn, 7r^(cr,p*) <  ((1 — 2 /n )n-1 +  l)/2.
Proof:
By virtue of strategy p*, where each rt- is chosen independently and 
equiprobably from the set {1, 2, . . . ,  n}, R\ is equally likely to be at any 
one of the n locations at every step independent of all previous actions. 
The same can be said about R 2. Hence, S  cannot do any better than 
choosing each of the n locations with probability 1/n at each step. And
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this is precisely strategy a* as described above. Thus the theorem follows 
immediately from (4.1). □
T h e o rem  4.5 For all p E /R n, ^ n i ^ p )  ^  ((1 — 2/rc)n-1 +  l)/2 .
Proof:
We shall first prove that if S  is using strategy cr*, it is not optimal for Ri 
and R 2 to engage in ‘repeated’ search, i.e., they do not search locations 
which are at the same distance apart for a second time. This is not 
surprising indeed since if the game continues after the first attem pt, the 
agents will not meet in their subsequent attempts and would have wasted 
the steps. Let r  =  ( x i ,y i , x 2,y 2, * * *) denote a pure strategy of R  which 
engages the agents in ‘repeated’ search at some step. Let A denote the 
set of integers k (<  n — 1) such that (Xk — Vk) is congruent (mod n) to 
(xj — yj) or 0 for some j  < k. The set A is non-empty by the choice of 
r. Modify strategy r  to strategy r by changing the actions of R\ and R 2 
at step k for all k  in the set A. For each k, choose a pair of locations 
(ctk,Sk) so that instead of visiting locations R\(xk ) and R 2(yk) at step k, 
Ri and R 2 visit locations R\(ak)  and R2(Sk) respectively, and ak — Sk is 
neither congruent (mod n) to any of the (Xj — yj) for all j  < k nor 0 . 
Such a pair of (ak,Sk) exists for each k since k is at most n — 1. Let cr- 
and cr- denote the events that S  wins at step j  when R  uses strategy r 
and r respectively (and S  uses strategy <rj). We first observe that the 
modification of strategy r to strategy f  ensures that
Secondly, when R  uses strategy r, the agents do not meet at step k (for 
all k in A). However, with strategy r, the agents meet with a positive 
probability, so that we have
Prob(cp =  Prob(cp ,V .7 0  A, j  < n — 1. (4.2)
Prob(c£) >  Prob(c£),V k E A. (4.3)
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Thirdly, strategy f  guarantees that the game ends by step n — 1. This 
implies that
Prob(c^) >  Prob(c^)(= 0) , V j  > n — 1. (4-4)
Combining (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4), we have
7r? « > r ) >  T . K ,  ?).
Hence, strategy r is not a best response to strategy a* of S. As a conse­
quence, any mixed strategy of R  which plays r  with a positive probability 
cannot be a best response as well. Since the starting distance between 
the agents is equally likely to be 1, 2, . . . ,  n — 1, the agents meet with a 
probability of l / ( n  — 1) if they adopt any one strategy which does not 
involve ‘repeated’ search, and in particular, if they adopt strategy p*. 
Hence, for all strategy p of 72, the payoff 7r^(cr*,p) is bounded below by 
7r„ (<r*,p*), which is ((1 — 2/ra)n_1 +  l)/2 , as given in (4.1). Hence the 
theorem holds. □
From Theorems 4.4 and 4.5, it is immediate that we have the following 
result.
T h e o rem  4.6 The value dn is ((1 — 2 /n )n_1 +  l )/2.
First, we note that ds(= 5/9) < V3  and d±(= 9/16) < v4; the common 
knowledge of the cycle D helps the rendezvous team secure lower values 
in these two instances. We further note that dn increases monotonically 
to (e"2 +  l ) /2  »  0.56767.
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4 .4  C om parison  W ith  R en d ezvou s-E vasion  
A s a  M u lti-S ta g e  G am e W ith  O bserved  
A ctio n s
We use this final section to compare the results obtained here with those 
in [16], where the rendezvous-evasion game is modelled and solved as a 
multi-stage game with observed actions. By this we mean that (1) all 
players knew the actions chosen at all previous steps 0, 1, 2, . . . ,  k —1 when 
choosing their actions at step k , and that (2) all players move simultane­
ously at each step k. In this latter setting, an action for any player may 
depend on the history of play. We interpret this version of rendezvous- 
evasion game as one where all players are obliged to announce their ac­
tions truthfully at the end of each step. We use vn and dn to denote the 
respective values of the corresponding games Tn and where actions 
have to be announced. We prove in [16] that v3 =  47/76, d3 = 5/9 and 
d4 =  17/32. Thus we have v3 =  v3, d3 = d3, d3 < v3 and d4 <  d4 < u4. 
To summarize, in all the instances that we consider, extra information 
either does not affect the value of the game (as when n is 3) or helps the 
rendezvous team secure a lower value.
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(0
*2(1)
* 1(1)
* 5(1)
(«)
*2(1)
* i ( l )  ♦ ■> ♦ 50)
f  action of agent R \
In (i), R wins;
In (ii), S wins.
Figure 4.1 a: Analysis of Step 1 (Player S stays still, p = 0)
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■» * *  > *
5 i ( l )  5 ( 1) 5 ( ] )
action o f  agent R  i * Player S wins
>
rT11 c ** Team R winsaction ot Player S
*** Game continues
Figure 4.1b: Analysis of Step 1 (Player S moves to location
S(2), (3=1)
1 1 0
R2(\)(=Ri(3) = S(3))
S (2 X = * , (1 »
action o f  agent R
location occupied by Player S in order to win in step 2
Figure 4.2 a: Analysis of Step 2, Type 1 action of strategy p*
1 1 1
( i ) R2(\)(=R,(3) = S(3))
K,(l)(=5(2)) 
Probability = 1/2
5(1)
(ii)
♦
K,(1)(=S(2)) 
Probability = 1/2
5(1)
action of Agent R i  in step 2
location occupied by Player S in order to win in step 2
Figure 4.2 b: Analysis of Step 2, Type 2 action of strategy p*
1 1 2
(i) R2(\)(=Rl(3) = S(3))
5(2)
Probability = 1 / 2
tf,(2)(=5(l))
(>i) R2(l)(=Rl(3) = S(3))
5(2)
Probability = 1 / 2
action o f  Agent R2 in step 2
fl2(l)(=5(l))
location occupied by Player S in order to win in step 3
Figure 4.2 c: Analysis of Step 2, Type 3 action of strategy p*
113
5 2(1)
*(i) >  ♦ <
5 2( 1)
*(ii) >  ♦ <
5  id ) S( 1) 5,(1) 5(1)
***(iii) /?2(i)
♦
5,(1) 5(1)
*(v) 5 2(1)
♦ <
5.(1) 5(1)
>(vii) 5 2(1)
5.(1)
-> ♦ 
5(1)
>  action of Player S at step 1
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♦
5,(1)
* Player S wins 
** Team R wins 
*** Game continues
5(1)
Figure 4.3: Analysis of Theorem 4.1 Case 2 (Step 1)
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action of agent R i in step 1 * Player S wins
** Team R winsaction of Player S in step 1
*** Game continues
Figure 4. 4: Analysis of Theorem 4.1 Case 3 (Step 1)
115
*** (i)
A
♦ /J(iv)
•  <
5( 1)
***
(vii)
5( 1)
fliO)
•  < •
S (  1 ) R 2( 1)
->
fl20 )
*(ii)
SO)
f i l O )  * ( v )
•  •
R 2d )  S ( l )
/?l(l) ***
(viii)
SO)
* 1(1)
R 2( \ )
R iO)
r 2( \ )
Ri d)
* 2( 0
(iii)
A
5( 1)
*(vi)
5( 1)
**A(ix)
* S winL,
-> action of S
* i( i)
A
R 2(  1 )  
R id )
A
* 2( 0
* lO )
A
S (  1) R 2( 1)
** Rwins
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Figure 4.5: Analysis of Step 1 when S uses a and R uses action (1,2,14)
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List of C o rrec tio n s
page 2, line 5, R smjn should be R s^ m 
page 2, line 7, R ^ n should be R ^ m
page 17, line -4, ... in the paper have not been included ...
page 17, line -2, ... either does not change ...
page 20, line 1, ... either d ire c tio n  so that ...
page 26, line 7, ... show in Section  2.5 that ...
page 27, line 13, ... is equal to ...
page 29, line 11, ... the players are placed at positions 0,1, and 2 a t  random , so ...
page 29, line 17, Since T h e o rem  2.1  says that ...
page 32, line 9, replace the first part of the sentence by:
T h e  a lg o rith m  uses th e  b ran ch  an d  b o u n d  tech n iq u e , i.e ., instead of 
computing the expected meeting time ...
page 33, line 5, ... at most B ^-1- W e define P by  in d u c tio n  on k. Let Pi ...
page 37, line -6, ... in 2-person rendezvous, no two cases have th e  sam e m eeting
tim e. This observation is based on ...
page 37, last line, ... proved in [17]: th a t  the meeting times ...
page 39, line 12, ... I t  suffices to  find a mixed strategy which if ...
page 43, line 2, ... starting from a  random ... .
page 44, line 10, ... we have r2 =  3.5, r3 =  3.0 ...
page 53, Scenario 3: ...towards each o th er; while ...
page 56, last line, ... is equal to ...
page 60, line 15, ... we will say th a t  ( / , g) has permutation type ...
page 60, line -3, ... as well as the least expected ...
page 60, line -2, ... which achieve the minimax ...
page 67, line 6, ... can achieve a maximum meeting time ...
page 69, last line, ... with each p reced ed  by a slope ...
page 72, line 8, ... be achieved, player II ...
page 89, line 4, ... prove that v$ is 47 /76 . We subsequently ...
page 92, line -3 ... At step 3, co o rd in a te  to meet ...
page 99, line -3, ... each of the lo ca tio n s at step 3 ...
page 115, Figure 4.4, the key of the arrows should be interchanged, i.e., the dotted 
arrow replaced by the solid arrow and vice versa.
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